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Financing of the activities arising from Security Council resolution 1863 (2009)

Budget performance on the financing of support for the African Union Mission in Somalia for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011

Report of the Secretary-General

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Summary

The total expenditure for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 has been linked to the objectives of the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia through the support component of the results-based-budgeting frameworks.

Performance of financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011)

			Variance	
Category	*Apportionment*[a]	*Expenditure*	*Amount*	*Percentage*
Military and police personnel	45 888.8	40 062.7	5 826.1	12.7
Civilian personnel	23 576.7	23 597.4	(20.7)	(0.1)
Operational costs	140 758.3	146 429.0	(5 670.7)	(4.0)
Gross requirements	**210 223.8**	**210 089.1**	**134.7**	**0.1**
Staff assessment income	2 681.3	3 082.3	(401.0)	(15.0)
Net requirements	**207 542.5**	**207 006.8**	**535.7**	**0.3**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—	—
Total requirements	**210 223.8**	**210 089.1**	**134.7**	**0.1**

[a] Inclusive of commitment authority in the amount of $35,905,600 approved with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

Human resources incumbency performance

Category	*Approved*[a]	*Planned*	*Actual (average)*	*Vacancy rate (percentage)*[b]
Military contingents	12 000	10 479	7 960	24.0
African Union police	270	162	43	73.5
International staff	145	145	119	17.9
National staff	104	104	87	16.3
Temporary positions[c]				
International staff	—	—	—	—
National staff	—	—	—	—

[a] Represents the highest level of authorized strength.
[b] Based on planned monthly incumbency and monthly strength.
[c] Funded under general temporary assistance.

The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in section V of the present report.

I. Introduction

1. The budget for the maintenance of support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 was set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 29 January 2010 (A/64/644) and amounted to $205,221,300 gross ($202,327,100 net). It provided for 8,000 military contingent personnel, 270 African Union police personnel, 146 international staff and 104 national staff, including 16 National Officers.

2. In paragraph 59 of its report of 23 April 2010 (A/64/754), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended that the General Assembly appropriate $182,504,770 gross for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011.

3. The General Assembly, by its resolution 64/287, appropriated an amount of $174,318,200 gross ($171,806,400 net) for the maintenance of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011. The total amount has been assessed on Member States.

4. In its letter dated 28 April 2011, the Advisory Committee concurred with the request made by the Secretary-General for authorization to enter into commitments in an amount not to exceed $35,905,600 for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011.

II. Mandate performance

A. Overall

5. The mandate for the support provided to AMISOM was established by the Security Council by its resolutions 1772 (2007) and 1863 (2009) and extended by the Council by subsequent resolutions. The mandate for the performance reporting period was provided by the Council in its resolutions 1910 (2010) and 1964 (2010).

6. UNSOA is mandated to help the Security Council to attain an overall objective, namely, the provision of a logistical support package to AMISOM.

7. As part of that overall objective, UNSOA, during the performance reporting period, contributed to a number of accomplishments by delivering related key outputs, as shown in the frameworks below.

8. The present report assesses actual performance against the results-based-budgeting frameworks set out in the 2010/11 budget. In particular, the performance report compares the actual indicators of achievement, that is, the extent to which actual progress has been made during the period against the expected accomplishments, with the planned indicators of achievement, and compares the actual completed outputs with the planned outputs.

B. Budget implementation and mission support initiatives

9. The main priority for UNSOA in 2010/11 was the consolidation and delivery of the logistical support package initiated during the previous budgetary period to support the full deployment of AMISOM. The planning assumptions thus foresaw

emplacing remaining battalions and rotating troops in-theatre, continuing to supply fuel and rations, finalizing the second phase of the construction programme, and upgrading the tactical and strategic capability of AMISOM in the area of information and communications technology.

10. In December 2010 through resolution 1964 (2010), the Security Council increased the authorized troop strength of AMISOM from 8,000 to 12,000 to enhance its ability to carry out its mandate. Following the adoption of the resolution, AMISOM deployed 1,000 additional troops to Mogadishu. During the same period, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) liquidated and UNSOA received assets from MINURCAT for which funds for freight were required. UNSOA had actively managed its priorities throughout the period, absorbing unbudgeted costs within its existing resources to the greatest extent possible. In April 2011, in order to meet the funding requirements of additional troops and freight costs, the Advisory Committee concurred with the request made by the Secretary-General for authorization to enter into commitments in an amount not to exceed $35,905,600 for the period from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011.

11. The resources available in 2010/11 were fully utilized during the period. UNSOA experienced higher requirements than anticipated for defensive stores and medical services, as a result of an increase in force and military operations by the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM, as well as increased requirements for other supplies, services and equipment, consultants, and ground transportation. The increased requirements were met through reduced requirements for facilities and infrastructure owing to the security level 5 situation in-theatre, which adversely affected the construction programme; lower-than-planned spending on freight for contingent-owned equipment, owing to deployments by AMISOM troop-contributing countries with lower volumes of contingent-owned equipment than expected; the delivery of contingent-owned equipment directly into theatre by means of bilateral support; and lower-than-planned deployment of troops.

12. Several external factors affected the implementation by UNSOA of its mandate during the performance reporting period. The severe security situation, coupled with the intensification of AMISOM combat operations against Al-Shabab, delayed the construction programme, restricted the access of United Nations personnel to Mogadishu, and increased requirements related to medical air evacuations and services. The Mission's lack of enabling units resulted in the use of combat troops for support functions such as construction works and fuel replenishment, instead of the primary task of securing Mogadishu. The limited ability of troop-contributing countries to provide self-sustainment required an increased focus by UNSOA on securing donor funding and the procurement and delivery of self-sustainment, in addition to the delivery of the logistical support package.

13. The reporting period was a milestone in the implementation by AMISOM and UNSOA of their mandates. AMISOM, together with Government forces, laid the foundation for the removal of Al-Shabab from Mogadishu by engaging in intense combat that required high levels of flexible and timely support from UNSOA. The intense combat level, elevated risk and dangerous security situation placed high demands on the delivery of UNSOA services. Despite this, UNSOA proved that its support model, developed in earlier periods, worked effectively and efficiently, and

AMISOM received in a timely manner the support that it required, enabling it to operate with a high level of effectiveness in a precarious environment.

14. UNSOA continued to engage in a variety of partnerships with AMISOM and contractors in which each party was able to provide relevant resources in order to meet mandated requirements. These partnerships allowed UNSOA to operate more effectively in the unstable security environment, reduced United Nations staff requirements and associated costs, provided AMISOM with ownership of its support operations, and encouraged AMISOM capacity-building.

15. Despite the security situation in Mogadishu, UNSOA made progress in providing United Nations standard support services to AMISOM. The focus of UNSOA was centred on supporting tactical operations, which included providing protective stores for defensive works, portable power and water for forward military locations, and combat ration packs for contingent personnel; maintaining and repairing critical fighting vehicles; extending communications to allow fighting forces to effectively command and control operations; and providing timely medical evacuations to level III and level IV medical facilities. In addition, UNSOA contractors carried out significant permanent works in western Mogadishu where security conditions allowed.

16. UNSOA continued to deliver rations to AMISOM during 2010/11. Fresh and dry rations were shipped to Mogadishu twice a month and distributed from a centralized point at the forward logistics base at Mogadishu international airport. UNSOA installed 100-person kitchens in major camps, and improved central kitchens to provide meals to forward deployed troops, while also conducting training on food health, safety and handling procedures for more than 200 AMISOM personnel.

17. A new turnkey fuel contract was mobilized in January 2011. In addition to fuel being delivered, a fuel reserve of 1 million litres of diesel was established in Mogadishu, together with four fuel distribution points, including emergency reserves at each site.

18. The UNSOA construction programme continued, with the completion of planned office and accommodation space, ablution areas and septic tank installations, among other projects, at all permanent AMISOM deployment locations, including Mogadishu international airport, the university, the military academy, the Al Jazeera I, II and III training facilities, the Uruba Hotel, the seaport and Villa Somalia. Other construction projects at the military academy, Villa Somalia, the seaport and Al Jazeera I, II and III progressed but were not completed as planned, owing to the military offensive and the high level of insecurity in the area. The construction of the interim AMISOM force headquarters and the AMISOM movement control terminal were completed, the permanent conference facility became operational, and the first phase of construction of the permanent headquarters facility began. In addition, a forward logistics base was established at Mogadishu international airport, which included warehouses, a rations distribution point and a container yard to allow for the storage of material. An AMISOM training facility, which was nearing completion at the end of the performance reporting period, will allow UNSOA to train personnel within Mogadishu itself, instead of elsewhere in the region. During the performance reporting period, UNSOA provided reliable and constant power to more than 3,500 people, with construction under way to supply another 1,600 persons in Mogadishu. UNSOA installed 10 water storage

tanks, including 3 at Mogadishu international airport, 2 at the university, and 1 each at Al Jazeera I, Al Jazeera II, Digfer hospital, the Uruba Hotel and the military academy, and provided AMISOM with 12 new boreholes, while repairing two others. In addition, an equipment maintenance and operator contract was established to support AMISOM with engineering services such as road repair and sewage collection.

19. UNSOA continued to be heavily engaged in the provision of medical support to contingent personnel. Level III and level IV hospital services in Kenya, Uganda and South Africa were operational and worked effectively, and extensive improvements were made to the AMISOM level I and level II medical facilities. In addition, UNSOA provided comprehensive medical evacuation services for AMISOM troops using purpose-equipped commercial aircraft. Medical evacuations were provided for 1,075 patients during the performance reporting period, with 824 of the evacuations being carried out after January 2011.

20. UNSOA rotated or deployed 11,747 troops and sent 28 vessels with $57.5 million worth of food and non-food items to Mogadishu during the performance reporting period.

21. A secure strategic communications network was established, linking AMISOM force headquarters in Mogadishu with AMISOM mission headquarters in Nairobi, and a terrestrial trunked radio system for secure tactical communications was established in Mogadishu.

22. To support AMISOM logistical efforts, UNSOA provided heavy transport vehicles, including fire trucks and material-handling equipment, as well as armoured vehicles to protect VIPs and senior leaders, and also provided patrol boats to enable the Mission to conduct maritime surveillance and protective operations.

23. In September 2010, UNSOA established a contract with a third-party vendor for the maintenance and repair of vehicles, generators, water treatment plants and maritime equipment. The contract set up a partnership in which AMISOM provided required personnel, UNSOA provided spare parts, and the vendor provided mechanics, trainers and a vehicle repair workshop facilitating 750 inspections, 700 maintenance works and more than 1,000 repairs of various types of equipment.

24. UNSOA continued to provide capacity-building to AMISOM personnel with regard to United Nations support policies, processes and procedures as well as the operation and maintenance of United Nations-owned equipment. Training was focused on logistical and technical areas, and included information and communications technology, aviation operations and security, movement control, property management, rations, supplies and medical services. A total of 1,170 AMISOM personnel were trained during the performance reporting period, as compared with 498 in 2009/10.

25. UNSOA conducted quarterly inspections of major equipment provided by troop-contributing countries through a commercial contractor, and verified 99.73 per cent of contingent-owned equipment.

26. UNSOA continued to provide public information and strategic communications support to AMISOM in both Mogadishu and Nairobi. In implementing the AMISOM communications strategy, UNSOA sought to establish a presence within the Somali information environment in order to gain broad popular

support and understanding among Somalis of the role of AMISOM. To achieve this, UNSOA coordinated activities in four areas: research; press, media and outreach; print and audio-visual production; and Radio Bar Kulan.

27. UNSOA had achieved an overall deployment rate of 92 per cent for international and national staff as at 30 June 2011, compared with 41 per cent at the same time in the prior period.

C. Regional mission cooperation

28. UNSOA continued to provide support to the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) comprising the full range of human resources, financial, procurement, technical services and budget management support areas. UNSOA also worked closely with the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in planning its support for AMISOM and the African Union.

29. UNSOA increased its level of cooperation with the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe, Uganda, during the performance reporting period. UNSOA relied on the Regional Procurement Office for bidding exercises, on the support provided by the Regional Service Centre in the processing and approval of education grants, and on training in the areas of information and communications technology, project management and human resources management provided to UNSOA staff at the Centre. In addition, the Director of UNSOA, a member of the Regional Service Centre Steering Committee, regularly participated in Committee meetings.

D. Partnerships and country team coordination

30. The delivery of the UNSOA mandate required close coordination with the African Union and AMISOM. Weekly meetings were held with the military and civilian components of AMISOM in Nairobi and Mogadishu. The Director of UNSOA met on a regular basis with the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and the Force Commander of AMISOM, in addition to ensuring the participation of the Office in strategic and technical-level meetings held in Addis Ababa relating to AMISOM, including bimonthly meetings with the Ministers of Defence of troop-contributing countries.

31. UNSOA worked closely with bilateral partners of AMISOM to ensure proper coordination of the delivery of the support package to the Mission. In addition to frequent bilateral meetings with donor countries held in Nairobi to generate financial or in kind support for AMISOM, UNSOA convened weekly AMISOM partner meetings and participated in partner coordination meetings convened by the European Union in Addis Ababa.

32. The United Nations Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM, managed by UNSOA, has developed into a central element of the AMISOM funding stream, including for the reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment and the provision of sustainment. UNSOA undertook regular bilateral and multilateral meetings with partners to generate and sustain financial support for the Trust Fund.

33. UNSOA actively participated in weekly Somalia country team meetings and interacted on a regular basis with the Senior Policy Group on Somalia, chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, and with the Joint

Planning Unit. UNSOA also participated in the development of an integrated strategic framework for Somalia in cooperation with the Unit, UNPOS and the Somalia country team.

34. UNSOA cooperated with other organizations, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the World Food Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Office for Project Services, to ensure a standardized system for mapping and producing high-accuracy, three-dimensional maps of Mogadishu to assist in visualization and operational planning.

E. Results-based-budgeting frameworks

Component 1: provision of logistical support

35. UNSOA support for AMISOM was aimed at providing effective and efficient logistical, administrative and technical services to AMISOM troops, African Union police officers and civilian personnel. In implementing its mandate, UNSOA provided a range of support functions, including administrative services; the maintenance and construction of office and accommodation facilities; health care; the establishment and maintenance of an information and communications technology infrastructure; air, sea and surface transport operations; supply and resupply operations; and the provision of security services.

Expected accomplishment 1.1: delivery of a United Nations logistics support package to the African Union Mission in Somalia

Planned indicators of achievement	*Actual indicators of achievement*
1.1.1 Establishment of hard-wall and soft-wall accommodations, headquarters and hospital facilities for AMISOM personnel in Mogadishu	Facilities constructed in Mogadishu during the performance reporting period included primarily accommodation for approximately 1,500 personnel, office space for approximately 80 personnel, training (2 facilities), kitchen and dining (8 facilities), medical (2 facilities), conference spaces (1 facility), warehouses (11 facilities), workshops (3 facilities), a movement control terminal, and the UNPOS/UNSOA and AMISOM force headquarters
1.1.2 Establishment of United Nations commercial support arrangements for AMISOM	Achieved. Commercial contracts relating to fuel supply and services, food rations and bottled water, information support services, maintenance and repair of United Nations-owned, African Union-owned and contingent-owned equipment, freight forwarding and related services, and medical and casualty evacuations were established
1.1.3 Establishment of an effective internal control accountability framework	Achieved. The accountability framework was reviewed and updated in conjunction with the risk assessment update in March 2011

1.1.4 AMISOM personnel trained in United Nations-owned equipment, support policy, processes and procedures	Achieved. 1,170 AMISOM personnel were trained in the use of United Nations-owned equipment and in support policy, processes and procedures

Planned outputs	*Completed (number or yes/no)*	*Remarks*
Service improvements		
Implementation of the second year of a two-year construction programme for the upgrade of African Union troop accommodations to United Nations standards	22	Camps at various locations, from platoon to battalion company size, were completed
	18	Construction projects were ongoing at the end of the period
Implementation of sanitation services in all areas of troop occupation in Mogadishu to United Nations standards	Yes	Sanitation facilities were improved throughout AMISOM camps through the provision of prefabricated ablution units, septic tanks and soak-away pits, and the construction of field latrines
Implementation of United Nations standards, including in the areas of equipment and consumables, in order to provide improved health care and medical treatment	2	Medical facilities meeting United Nations standards were established. Additional AMISOM requirements, related to the high number of casualties and the limited medical self-sustainment capability of AMISOM military contingents, were accommodated as required
Military, African Union police and civilian personnel		
Emplacement, rotation and repatriation of an average strength of 7,929 contingent personnel and 162 African Union police officers	Yes	Average troop strength of military contingents was 7,960 during the period. The deployment of 2,867 troops took place, and a total of 11,747 troops were emplaced or rotated
	No	Average troop strength of African Union police officers was 43 during the period. A total of 30 African Union police officers were rotated in February 2011. The lower-than-budgeted emplacement of African Union police officers was due to the security situation in Mogadishu
Verification, monitoring and inspection of an estimated 114 contingent-owned vehicles per battalion, supplies and services provided in support of military and police personnel	Yes	Quarterly inspections were conducted by a third-party contractor in October 2010, January 2011 and April 2011 on 100 per cent of contingent-owned vehicles
Storage and supply of rations for an average strength of 7,929 military contingent personnel, 14 days' combat rations and 14 days' water reserves for military contingent personnel and 162 African Union police personnel in Mogadishu	7,960	Average strength of military contingent personnel provided with 14 days' combat rations and 14 days' water reserves
	43	Average number of African Union police personnel in Mogadishu provided with rations, owing to the lower-than-budgeted emplacement of African Union police officers as a result of the security situation in Mogadishu

Civilian personnel, coordination and accountability mechanisms		
Administration of an average of 250 civilian staff, comprising 146 international staff and 104 national staff	206	Average number of contracts administered, covering 119 international staff and 87 national staff The lower-than-planned output was due to delays in the recruitment process and the rejection of offers by selected candidates
Ongoing risk assessment and update of risk register in conjunction with the Office of Internal Oversight Services	Yes	Risk assessments were conducted throughout the year using risk registers and matrixes, including mitigation strategies and contingency plans, which were shared with the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support and the Office of Internal Oversight Services
Periodic review and update of accountability framework	Yes	A review and updating of the accountability framework, in conjunction with an updating of the risk assessment formulation, was completed in March 2011
Regular meetings with partners (AMISOM, UNPOS, major donors) to coordinate support provided by the United Nations (assessed and voluntary funding) and bilateral mechanisms to AMISOM	Yes	Weekly meetings with AMISOM, UNPOS and major donors were held to coordinate support provided to AMISOM by the United Nations and bilateral mechanisms
Facilities and infrastructure		
Operation and maintenance of 13 facilities in Mogadishu, 1 forward support base in Mombasa and 1 headquarters facility in Nairobi	Yes	UNSOA operated and maintained 32 facilities at 13 locations in Mogadishu, the Mombasa Support Base and the UNSOA/UNPOS headquarters facility in Nairobi
Construction of three camps, two with prefabricated buildings and one with permanent local construction. Erection of a perimeter defence for the main military site at Mogadishu airport	No	Camp construction progressed but was not completed, owing to the security situation in Mogadishu Perimeter projects compliant with minimum operating security standards, including the establishment of a Hesco Bastion wall, were in progress, with approximately 8 km out of a total of 9.5 km completed Planning for the construction of a 5 km high-security fence and a 6 km concertina fence was in progress at the end of the period A contract for the installation of a 10 km chain-link fence was established
Sanitation services for all premises, including sewage and garbage collection and disposal	20	Camp locations had water supply and sewage system projects completed
	7	Camp locations had water supply and sewage system projects in progress at the end of the period

Operation and maintenance of 59 United Nations-owned and 36 contingent-owned water and wastewater purification plants in Mogadishu	5	United Nations-owned water treatment plants became operational in June 2011
	1	United Nations-owned wastewater treatment plant was operated and maintained
	14	Contingent-owned water treatment plants were operated and maintained
		The lower-than-planned output was due to delays in the establishment of contractual arrangements for the installation of plants in Mogadishu
Operation and maintenance of 194 United Nations-owned and 72 contingent-owned generators in 3 locations	143	United Nations-owned equipment generators were operated and maintained at 9 permanent camp locations and up to 30 mobile or temporary forward and tactical positions throughout Mogadishu. Not all generators procured during the period were installed, owing to the security situation, which delayed the construction programme
	94	Contingent-owned generators were operated and maintained at all permanent AMISOM locations and at more than 30 forward positions throughout Mogadishu
Storage and supply of 7 million litres of petrol, oil and lubricants for generators	1.9 million	Litres of petrol, oil and lubricants were provided for generators in Mogadishu
		The reduced supply of petrol was due to the delay in the deployment of AMISOM personnel and the delayed construction of hard-wall accommodation facilities in Mogadishu
Construction of 10 km of gravel roads for the three new camps in Mogadishu	No	Mobilization of a third-party contract was ongoing at the end of the period. Internal roads were maintained by AMISOM
Maintenance and repair of 1 airfield facility and 1 seaport facility in Mogadishu	Yes	Maintenance and repair of the airfield facility were ongoing at the end of the period
	No	UNSOA was unable to maintain and repair the seaport facility, owing to the security situation, which prevented access to the premises
Maintenance and renovation of 9 storage facilities for petrol, oil and lubricants in 9 locations	4	Storage facilities were maintained and renovated
		The lower-than-planned output was due to the security situation in Mogadishu
Construction of 3 petrol storage facilities in 3 locations in Mogadishu	4	Petrol storage facilities were constructed and operational in Mogadishu at Mogadishu international airport, AMISOM force headquarters, the university and the military academy. A strategic fuel reserve of 1 million litres was established at Mogadishu international airport

		The higher-than-planned output was due to the parti redeployment of the Burundian contingent from the university to the military academy
Geographic Information System		
Provision of topographic, engineering and communications mapping support to AMISOM for planning and operations within its area of operation	Yes	125 different maps were produced
Development of situational awareness and required Geographic Information System (GIS) security application for assessment of risks and mitigations for both AMISOM and UNSOA	Yes	The GIS security application was completed. Implementation of the application and completion o the situational awareness display were pending
Ground transportation		
Operation and maintenance of 193 United Nations-owned vehicles, including 36 armoured vehicles, and 1,026 contingent-owned vehicles	313	United Nations-owned vehicles were operated and maintained
	49	Armoured vehicles were operated and maintained
		The higher-than-planned output was due to the unexpected transfer of vehicles from other missions particular the United Nations Interim Force in Leba
	497	AMISOM-owned vehicles were operated and maintained
		The lower-than-planned output was due to the deployment by AMISOM of lower quantities of contingent-owned vehicles than expected
Supply of 4.4 million litres of petrol, oil and lubricants for ground transportation	2.1 million	Litres of petrol, oil and lubricants were supplied for ground transportation
		The lower-than-planned supply was due to the delay deployment of AMISOM personnel and the fact tha there were fewer AMISOM-owned vehicles than planned
Operation of a daily shuttle service 6 days a week for an average of 145 United Nations international personnel per day from their accommodation to mission area	Yes	A daily shuttle service transporting personnel from accommodations to the mission area operated 5 day week for an average of 161 United Nations international personnel per day
Air transportation		
Operation and maintenance of 1 fixed-wing aircraft	No	Air movement in support of AMISOM and UNSOA provided through third-party contractors
Supply of 2.6 million litres of petrol, oil and lubricants for air operations	No	Air movement in support of AMISOM and UNSOA provided through third-party contractors

Naval transportation		
Maintenance of 6 patrol boats to secure inshore and over-water in-flight activities in Mogadishu	5	Patrol boats and 14 engines were maintained to secure inshore and over-water in-flight activities in Mogadishu
Supply of 0.2 million litres of petrol, oil and lubricants for naval transportation	0.1 million	Litres of petrol, oil and lubricants were supplied for naval transportation The lower-than-envisaged supply was due to the delayed deployment of AMISOM personnel and the fact that there were fewer naval patrol operations than planned
Communications		
Support and maintenance of a satellite network with links to AMISOM in Mogadishu and Nairobi, the African Union in Addis Ababa, United Nations Headquarters in New York, UNSOA headquarters in Nairobi, the Information Support Management Section broadcasting studio in Nairobi and the support base in Mombasa to provide voice, fax and data communications and videoconferencing	Yes	The satellite network was established at all intended locations, including the connection through the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, to link AMISOM force headquarters in Mogadishu to the African Union in Addis Ababa. Information and communications technology facilities and services were also provided and included telephony, e-mail and videoconferencing capabilities. In addition, Internet capability was available through the United Nations Logistics Base and was enhanced with the commercial satellite Internet service at AMISOM force headquarters and the university in Mogadishu, which serves as the Burundian contingent headquarters in Mogadishu
Support and maintenance of voice data connectivity between the 9 AMISOM battalions and key AMISOM support locations, including, but not limited to, the airport, the seaport, Villa Somalia, the university, the academy and KM4	No	Connection for voice, fax, video and data communications between AMISOM force headquarters at Mogadishu international airport and the seaport, Villa Somalia, the university, the academy and KM4 was established through terrestrial microwave linked to a satellite network at AMISOM force headquarters. Voice and data connectivity to 9 AMISOM battalions and other key locations was pending the deployment of troops
Support and maintenance of a satellite network consisting of 1 Earth station hub to provide voice, fax, video and data communications	Yes	Support and maintenance of a satellite network was provided through the United Nations Logistics Base. The migration of hub services to the Mombasa satellite hub was ongoing at the end of the period
Support and maintenance of 11 very small aperture terminal (VSAT) systems, 11 telephone exchanges and 14 microwave links	No	Support and maintenance were provided for 5 VSAT systems, 2 telephone exchanges, 5 microwave links and 4 mobile deployable telecommunications systems Further progress was pending the deployment of troops

Support and maintenance of 69 high-frequency, 13 very-high-frequency (VHF) and 9 ultra-high-frequency (UHF) repeaters and transmitters, and 1,900 TETRA trunking radios	No	69 high-frequency and 13 very-high-frequency transmitters were no longer planned for deployment, as they no longer complied with safety and security requirements in Mogadishu
		The following information technology equipment was supported and maintained: 7 UHF repeaters, with 2 pending the full deployment of AMISOM troops
	2,356	Trunking radios, comprising 2,180 handheld radios, 126 mobile radios and 50 base station radios
		The support and maintenance of a higher-than-planned number of trunking radios was due primarily to the further development of a secured communications infrastructure, which consequently required additional radios
Support and maintenance of one radio production facility in support of AMISOM and one radio broadcast facility in Mogadishu	Yes	A radio production facility in Nairobi and a broadcast facility in Mogadishu for Radio Bar Kulan were established and operational
Support public information campaigns for AMISOM through the management of contractors engaged to implement the AMISOM communication strategy	Yes	100 African Union personnel and UNSOA contractors worked to implement the AMISOM communications strategy
Information technology		
Support and maintenance of 122 servers, 567 desktop computers, 185 laptop computers, 132 printers and 52 digital senders in 5 locations	Yes	UNSOA reduced its number of servers and planned further reductions to meet its target of 36 physical servers in production
		UNSOA supported and maintained 468 desktop computers, 159 laptop computers, 66 printers and 18 digital senders in 5 locations
		The fact that a lower-than-planned number of desktop and laptop computers, printers and digital senders were supported and maintained was due to the difficulty in deploying equipment and personnel to Mogadishu
Support and maintenance of 3 local-area networks (LAN) and wide-area networks (WAN) in Nairobi, Mombasa and Mogadishu	No	A 300-user LAN in Nairobi was fully deployed, with the deployment of Internet protocol (IP) telephony pending completion in the third quarter of 2011
		LAN and IP telephony were fully deployed in Mombasa
		The deployment of LAN and IP telephony in Mogadishu is expected in the fourth quarter of 2011, pending the implementation of structured cabling, expected to be completed in the third quarter of 2011

Support and maintenance of the wireless area network	No	The support and maintenance of the Mombasa wireless area network was in progress at the end of the period owing to delays in the procurement of structured cabling installation The Mogadishu wireless area network was deployed in several office and accommodation locations The deployment of the Nairobi wireless area network was pending the approval of project deployment
Medical		
Maintenance of air evacuation arrangements for United Nations and AMISOM personnel to level III and level IV medical facilities in Nairobi; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and Pretoria	Yes	Air evacuation arrangements for United Nations and AMISOM personnel to level III and level IV medical facilities were maintained, with 1,075 personnel evacuated during the period
Support AMISOM level I and II medical facilities (9 level 1 and 2 level II) in Mogadishu with United Nations standard equipment and consumables	Yes	9 level I and 2 level II medical facilities were supported with medical supplies, and critical equipment was repaired in Mogadishu
Support the achievement by AMISOM of United Nations health and safety standards in Mogadishu	Yes	UNSOA supported the achievement by AMISOM of United Nations health and safety standards in Mogadishu through the operation of a level II medical facility at Mogadishu international airport and the construction of additional buildings to enhance the facility, which was in progress at the end of the period The provision of water supply for the level I medical facility at the university location was in progress at the end of the period Operations at the military academy and Villa Somalia level I clinics were ready to commence, pending improvement in the security situation
Security		
Provision of security services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for all mission areas	Yes	Security guards were deployed at all UNSOA facilities in Kenya 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with the exception of the UNSOA head office, for which security was provided by the United Nations Office at Nairobi Armed police were deployed at the UNSOA broadcast facility at Spring Valley A luggage scanner and a walk-through metal detector were installed and operating at the offices of the UNSOA Aviation and Movement Control Section at Wilson airport and Spring Valley

		Emergency response arrangements were implemented at the Mombasa Support Base and the offices of the UNSOA Aviation and Movement Control Section at Wilson airport and Spring Valley Night guard dogs were deployed at Spring Valley and at the Mombasa Support Base All security arrangements were provided by commercial security service providers, with UNSOA security staff supervising and managing personnel and services
Mission-wide site security assessment	Yes	Security risk assessments were conducted for all UNSOA establishments and were reviewed and updated to address changing security scenarios
Establishment of minimum operating security standards and minimum operating residential security standards in UNSOA and AMISOM locations in Nairobi, Mombasa and Mogadishu	Yes	Minimum operating security standards and minimum operating residential security standards were established for all locations in Nairobi, Mombasa and Mogadishu In addition to the completion of security assessments in Nairobi and Mombasa, a total of 103 staff members underwent security training on "Safe and secure approaches in field environments"
Training		
Continued induction training in support policy, processes and procedures in the different functional (logistics and administrative) areas, as well as installation, operation and maintenance of United Nations-owned equipment provided under the logistical support package for AMISOM personnel	Yes	1,170 AMISOM personnel were trained in United Nations support policies, processes and procedures
Continued mine action explosive ordnance disposal induction training for AMISOM military contingent personnel to enhance AMISOM freedom of movement	9	Predeployment training sessions were held for 640 AMISOM military personnel on the use of AMISOM equipment prior to every rotation Predeployment and refresher training was provided to 1,030 personnel on aviation, movement control, property management, supply, engineering, transport, information and communications technology and United Nations logistics, in Mombasa and Nairobi In-mission training was provided to 560 personnel on kitchen and catering services and the defence cell, in Mogadishu

	Advanced explosive ordnance disposal training, mentorship and support were provided to six AMISOM explosive ordnance disposal teams

Expected accomplishment 1.2: Provide effective administrative support to the United Nations Political Office for Somalia

Planned indicators of achievement	*Actual indicators of achievement*
UNPOS receives the administrative support to successfully implement its mandate	Achieved. UNPOS received full administrative support from UNSOA, both in Nairobi and in Somalia. In addition, all posts that had formerly been under the Support Coordination Unit of UNPOS had been integrated into UNSOA as at 1 July 2011

Planned outputs	*Completed (number or yes/no)*	*Remarks*
Provision of a full range of human resources management support, including staff administration, recruitment and development	Yes	UNSOA provided a full range of human resources management to UNPOS, ranging from the recruitment of candidates to the administration of entitlements, benefits and consultants. The average number of staff managed was 61, comprising 49 international and 12 national staff. Recruitment activities resulted in the engagement of 13 international and 15 national staff
Implementation of effective financial support to UNPOS, in close coordination with the UNPOS regional coordination unit	Yes	UNSOA prepared UNPOS financial statements, and processed 50 travel expense claims and 30 vendor payments per month
Provision of procurement support services to enable UNPOS to obtain goods and services in the shortest possible time, establish procurement plans, support disposal of property and manage contracts	Yes	UNSOA processed 60 UNPOS requisitions and 58 UNPOS purchase orders, conducted a comprehensive site visit to Hargeysa regarding a potential UNPOS location, and identified potential companies and bidders in the region
Provision of support for both internal and external audit missions of UNPOS administrative management and provision of responses to pending previous audit observations	No	No internal or external audit missions were conducted during the performance reporting period
Formulation, implementation, monitoring and reporting of UNPOS assessed budget and trust fund activities	Yes	UNSOA formulated the UNPOS budget for 2012, monitored the UNPOS 2011 budget, and managed and monitored contributions made to the UNPOS trust fund in support of Somali transitional security institutions and Trust Fund for Peacebuilding in Somalia

III. Resource performance

A. Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars, budget year is from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011)

			Variance	
	Apportionment[a]	Expenditure	Amount	Percentage
Category	(1)	(2)	(3) = (1)-(2)	(4) = (3) ÷ (1)
Military and police personnel				
Military observers				
Military contingents	45 594.0	40 050.4	5 543.6	12.2
United Nations police	294.8	12.3	282.5	95.8
Formed police units				
Subtotal	**45 888.8**	**40 062.7**	**5 826.1**	**12.7**
Civilian personnel				
International staff	19 657.8	20 294.1	(636.3)	(3.2)
National staff	3 918.9	3 303.3	615.6	15.7
United Nations Volunteers				
General temporary assistance				
Subtotal	**23 576.7**	**23 597.4**	**(20.7)**	**(0.1)**
Operational costs				
Government-provided personnel				
Civilian electoral observers				
Consultants	56.0	2 265.4	(2 209.4)	(3 945.4)
Official travel	928.8	1 750.7	(821.9)	(88.5)
Facilities and infrastructure	65 422.9	57 771.6	7 651.3	11.7
Ground transportation	9 470.0	11 458.4	(1 988.4)	(21.0)
Air transportation	1 143.4	1 752.6	(609.2)	(53.3)
Naval transportation	431.4	403.1	28.3	6.6
Communications	14 263.4	13 945.5	317.9	2.2
Information technology	3 679.3	3 041.1	638.2	17.3
Medical	6 430.6	12 775.0	(6 344.4)	(98.7)
Special equipment				
Other supplies, services and equipment	38 932.5	41 265.6	(2 333.1)	(6.0)
Quick-impact projects				
Subtotal	**140 758.3**	**146 429.0**	**(5 670.7)**	**(4.0)**
Gross requirements	**210 223.8**	**210 089.1**	**134.7**	**0.1**
Staff assessment income	2 681.3	3 082.3	(401.0)	(15.0)
Net requirements	**207 542.5**	**207 006.8**	**535.7**	**0.3**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)				
Total requirements	**210 223.8**	**210 089.1**	**134.7**	**0.1**

[a] Inclusive of commitment authority in the amount of $35,905,600 approved with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

B. Expenditure for the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe, Uganda

(Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011)

Category	*Expenditure*
Civilian personnel	
International staff	—
National staff	—
United Nations Volunteers	—
General temporary assistance	—
Subtotal	—
Operational costs	
Consultants	—
Official travel	2.1
Facilities and infrastructure	3.9
Ground transportation	3.0
Air transportation	—
Communications	0.4
Information technology	1.5
Medical	0.3
Special equipment	—
Other supplies, services and equipment	0.8
Subtotal	**12.0**
Gross requirements	**12.0**
Staff assessment income	—
Net requirements	**12.0**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—
Total requirements	**12.0**

36. The Regional Service Centre at the logistics hub at Entebbe, Uganda, was established by the General Assembly by its resolution 64/269, with effect from 1 July 2010. It was decided that the personnel and financial resources of the Centre for 2010/11 would be provided mainly through redeployment from the missions to be served by the Centre (the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UNSOA, the United Nations Office in Burundi, and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic). The costs for each of these missions were based on the proportion of the approved total mission budget (gross) for 2010/11 against the total budget of the missions.

C. Summary information on redeployments across groups

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Group	*Appropriation*		
	Original distribution	*Redeployment*	*Revised distribution*
I. Military and police personnel	45 888.8	(5 735.0)	40 153.8
II. Civilian personnel	23 576.6	22.6	23 599.3
III. Operational costs	140 758.3	5 712.4	146 470.7
Total	**210 223.8**	—	**210 223.8**
Percentage of redeployment to total appropriation			**2.7**

37. Owing to the intense engagement of AMISOM in combat operations against anti-Government elements and the continuing insecurity in Mogadishu, it was necessary that UNSOA reprioritize requirements in its budget implementation. Operational costs in group III were higher than planned, owing primarily to the high cost of medical services, including evacuations and hospitalization expenses; other supplies, services and equipment to cover exchange rate fluctuations, the procurement of equipment and the establishment of a tracking system; costs for consultants in Mogadishu, as United Nations staff could not be deployed in the prevailing security situation; and maintenance services for AMISOM vehicles and equipment. Increased requirements in group III were met through reduced requirements in group I, due primarily to the deployment of less contingent-owned equipment than planned and the emplacement of 1,000 AMISOM military personnel, as compared with the budgeted emplacement of 2,550 troops.

D. Monthly expenditure pattern



38. The higher expenditure during the months of September 2010 and March 2011 resulted primarily from a rations contract to support AMISOM military contingents in Somalia for which commitments are reviewed biannually. The higher expenditure in December 2010 was due primarily to commitments against contractual arrangements for construction services and strategic communications in support of AMISOM. The higher expenditure in June 2011 resulted from commitments that needed to be implemented within a short period of time before the end of the period.

E. Other income and adjustments

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	*Amount*
Interest income	1 492.2
Other/miscellaneous income	149.5
Voluntary contributions in cash	—
Prior-period adjustments	—
Cancellation of prior-period obligations	9 953.9
Total	**11 595.6**

IV. Analysis of variances[1]

	Variance	
Military contingents	$5 543.6	12.2%

39. The reduced requirements were attributable primarily to deployments by AMISOM troop-contributing countries with lower volumes of contingent-owned equipment than a standard United Nations battalion, as well as the delivery of contingent-owned equipment directly into theatre through bilateral support. The reduced requirements were also attributable to the delay in the deployment of troops, which had been planned to be carried out by 30 June 2011.

	Variance	
African Union police	$282.5	95.8%

40. The reduced requirements were attributable primarily to the lower actual monthly average deployment of 43 AMISOM police personnel during the budgetary period as compared with the planned monthly average deployment of 162 AMISOM police personnel, owing to the security situation in Mogadishu, which resulted in lower-than-budgeted travel costs for emplacement, rotation and repatriation, and rations.

[1] Resource variance amounts are expressed in thousands of United States dollars. Analysis is provided for variances of at least plus or minus 5 per cent or $100,000.

	Variance	
International staff	($636.3)	(3.2%)

41. The increased requirements were attributable primarily to the higher actual average monthly deployment of 119 international staff during the performance reporting period as compared with the budgeted average deployment of 87 international staff. The accelerated recruitment of civilian staff reflected a 17.9 per cent vacancy rate during the reporting period, as compared with the rate of 40 per cent applied in the budget.

	Variance	
National staff	$615.6	15.7%

42. The reduced requirements were attributable primarily to lower requirements for common staff costs. The requirements reflected an average common staff cost expenditure of $6,425 per person during the reporting period, as compared with the budgeted common staff cost provision of $19,985 per person.

	Variance	
Consultants	($2 209.4)	(3 945.4%)

43. The increased requirements were due primarily to the limitations placed on the ability of United Nations personnel to gain access to Mogadishu, as a result of the high level of insecurity that persisted in the city and restricted both the number of UNSOA staff visits and the implementation of planned projects. In order to monitor progress in Mogadishu, UNSOA therefore relied on individual contractors and consultants. The 2010/11 expenditure reflected the deployment of a monthly average of 19 consultancy experts in project and supply-chain management, as compared with the significantly lower 2010/11 budgeted amount for consultants, which had been limited to training fees.

	Variance	
Official travel	($821.9)	(88.5%)

44. The increased requirements were attributable mainly to increased visits to troop- and police-contributing countries for assistance and a higher-than-expected number of trips for consultations with political stakeholders and partners in support of UNSOA and AMISOM operations. The 2010/11 expenditure reflected 714 trips, as compared with the 452 budgeted trips, during the reporting period. The increased requirements were also attributable to the deployment of three temporary staff from other missions to temporarily support UNSOA activities.

	Variance	
Facilities and infrastructure	$7 651.3	11.7%

45. The reduced requirements were due primarily to the need to reprioritize resources in order to meet unforeseen operational requirements that emerged in the last half of the budgetary period owing to the intensified combat situation. In addition, the security level 5 situation in-theatre adversely affected the construction

programme, which led in turn to a reduction in requirements related primarily to construction services; petrol, oil and lubricants; and acquisitions of water purification equipment and water and septic tanks. The reduced requirements were offset in part by the unforeseen acquisition of accommodation equipment; they were also offset by unbudgeted costs related to the rental of premises within the AMISOM secured perimeter in Mogadishu to accommodate UNSOA civilian personnel and consultants pending the completion of the accommodation compliant with the UNSOA minimum operating security standards and minimum operating residential security standards, as well as the rental of premises at Wilson airport in Nairobi for operations of the Aviation and Movement Control Section.

	Variance	
Ground transportation	($1 988.4)	(21.0%)

46. The increased requirements were attributable in part to a long-term third-party maintenance services contract for AMISOM and United Nations-owned equipment in Mogadishu, which was not budgeted for during the performance period. The maintenance services contract covered African Union-owned equipment, United Nations-owned equipment and equipment donated by bilateral stakeholders. The increased requirements were also attributable to the unbudgeted payment for armoured vehicles that had been ordered and obligated in 2008/09 but were delivered only during the 2010/11 period, by which time the obligation had lapsed. In addition, the increased requirements were due to higher-than-budgeted expenditure for shuttle and transportation services to support the UNSOA operation in Nairobi and Mombasa. Further contributing to the increased requirements was the unbudgeted provision of shuttle buses for national civilian staff under the United Nations Office at Nairobi common services agreement during the reporting period.

	Variance	
Air transportation	($609.2)	(53.3%)

47. The increased requirements were attributable primarily to higher-than-budgeted costs for air charter services, as well as a provision allowing for air charter services required for passenger movement to be funded under other supplies, services and equipment, whereas the actual expenditure was recorded under air transportation.

	Variance	
Naval transportation	$28.3	6.6%

48. The reduced requirements were attributable primarily to the centralized distribution of oil and lubricants for generators, vehicles and naval vessels at Mogadishu international airport.

	Variance	
Communications	$317.9	2.2%

49. The reduced requirements were attributable in part to the non-renewal of the contractual arrangement for in-theatre information and communications technology support for AMISOM owing to delays in contract negotiations. UNSOA therefore relied on the leveraging of existing contractor support services and consultants to manage both limited-duration projects and short-term surge requirements. Reduced requirements were also attributable to the use of local Internet service providers in Kenya, which resulted in the non-commissioning of certain satellite requirements, as well as to the delayed establishment of satellite Internet services in Mogadishu owing to the security situation. The reduced requirements were offset in part by contract amendments to the AMISOM communications strategy resulting in additional costs related to security and maintenance of the contractor's infrastructure in Mogadishu.

	Variance	
Information technology	$638.2	17.3%

50. The reduced requirements were attributable in part to the non-renewal of the contractual arrangement for in-theatre information and communications technology support for AMISOM owing to delays in contract negotiations. UNSOA therefore relied on the leveraging of existing contractor support services and consultants to manage both limited-duration projects and short-term surge requirements. Reduced requirements were offset in part by the use of virtualizing desktop infrastructure terminals, which allowed the centralization of applications and data on a server rather than on individual desktop computers.

	Variance	
Medical	($6 344.4)	(98.7%)

51. The increased requirements were attributable primarily to the intensified combat situation in Mogadishu and to AMISOM tactical operations that required a higher number of evacuations and hospitalizations than anticipated. Requirements were also increased by the limited deployment of contingent-owned medical equipment and the need to upgrade AMISOM medical facilities to meet United Nations standards, which required UNSOA to procure medical equipment for level I and level II hospitals. Requirements were offset in part by the delay in the deployment of troops, which had been planned to be carried out by 30 June 2011.

	Variance	
Other supplies, services and equipment	($2 333.1)	(6.0%)

52. The increased requirements were due in part to exchange rate fluctuations that resulted in an overall loss on exchange, particularly between the United States dollar and the euro. Requirements were also increased by the procurement of shelving equipment and sundry items to support AMISOM operations in Mogadishu, as well as the establishment of a Global Positioning System tracking system at the Mombasa Support Base. The increased requirements were also attributable to

higher-than-expected costs for the movement of assets from Chad to Mombasa subsequent to the liquidation of MINURCAT, as well as to the higher-than-expected average monthly cost of sealift movements from Mombasa to Mogadishu. The increased requirements were offset in part by the delayed deployment of AMISOM troops who had been planned to be emplaced on or before 30 June 2011, which resulted in the non-tasking of three sealifts per month from April to June 2011. The increased requirements were also offset by lower-than-estimated bank charges, as well as the delayed mobilization of an inspection and verification service contract as a result of ongoing fee negotiations.

V. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

53. **The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of logistical support for AMISOM and other immediate activities related to a future United Nations peacekeeping are:**

(a) **To increase the appropriation by the amount of $35,770,900 for the period 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011, in addition to the amount of $174,318,200 previously appropriated for the maintenance of the support entity under the terms of its resolution 64/287, to the amount of $210,089,100, equal to expenditures incurred during the same period;**

(b) **Taking into account the amount of $174,318,200 already assessed on Member States for the maintenance of the support entity under the terms of its resolution 64/287, to decide to apply the other income in respect of the financial period ended 30 June 2011 in the total amount of $11,595,600 from interest income ($1,492,200), other/miscellaneous income ($149,500) and cancellation of prior-period obligations ($9,953,900), against the shortfall in assessment for the same period;**

(c) **To assess the additional amount of $24,175,300 for the maintenance of the support entity, representing the difference between the shortfall in assessment ($35,770,900) and other income ($11,595,600) for the period ended 30 June 2011.**

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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Progress in the implementation of the global field support strategy

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The report of the Secretary-General on the global field support strategy (A/64/633) outlined a five-year process to transform the delivery of support services to United Nations field missions. In its resolution 65/289, the General Assembly recognized the challenges faced by the Organization in providing logistical, administrative and information and communications technology support for peacekeeping operations, and recalled paragraph 143 of the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/65/743) noting the intention of the Secretary-General to provide more information on the impact of the strategy, including a fuller picture of costs, achievements and benchmarks.

In its resolution 64/269, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit an annual progress report on the implementation of the global field support strategy, detailing the status of each initiative, including:

(a) A timeline showing key activities, milestones and project deliverables;

(b) Benchmarks and baseline information on current activity levels, resource requirements, quality of services and the tools used for measuring efficiency gains and monitoring progress;

(c) Achievements in such areas as service delivery improvements, efficiency gains, cost savings and reductions in vacancy and turnover rates;

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(d) A full update on the actual costs incurred and administrative overheads related to the implementation of the various initiatives;

(e) Information on the quality of services provided to the military, police and civilian components and a determination of the methods for monitoring the impact of the implementation of the strategy on the quality of the services provided;

(f) An assessment of the adequacy of governance and management arrangements.

The present report describes results achieved during the first year of the five-year implementation timeline of the strategy. Since the adoption of resolution 64/269, considerable progress has been made:

- The first service package for a 200-person camp has been finalized in close collaboration with Member States
- New functions have been identified for consideration by Member States to be transferred to the Global Service Centre
- The Regional Service Centre at Entebbe, Uganda, is moving forward with the analysis of financial and human resources functions with a view to their transfer from participating missions
- The standardized funding model approved by the General Assembly will be implemented in the context of the first full-year budget for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan
- The human resources framework is advancing in close coordination with the Office of Human Resources Management

In accordance with section VII, paragraph 91, of resolution 65/289, consolidated information on the financial and human resources provided by client missions to the Regional Service Centre and on the shares of the resource requirements for the individual client missions will be provided in their respective budget proposals. Information on the vacancy rates, expenditures and budget performance of the Centre will be presented in a separate report for the consideration of the General Assembly.

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I. Introduction

1. The global field support strategy is aimed at enabling timelier mission start-up and improving support to mission operations, pursuing economies of scale where possible and appropriate. To achieve this objective, an integrated service delivery model that promotes greater accountability and transparency is being implemented.

2. In its resolution 65/289, the General Assembly expressed its appreciation for the efforts made by the Secretary-General to present an integrated approach to enable more timely mission start-up and deployment and to improve quality, efficiency, and economy of scale in the delivery of services to field missions. It also expressed its appreciation for the inclusive and participatory approach taken in developing and implementing the global field support strategy, and encouraged the Secretary-General to continue to intensify close consultation with Member States, in particular troop- and police-contributing countries, in its implementation.

3. In its resolution 65/310, the General Assembly endorsed the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/65/19), which recognized the work being done by the Secretariat on components (pillars) of the strategy: a financial framework, predefined modules and service packages, service centres, both global and regional, and an integrated human resources management framework. The Special Committee reaffirmed the need for an integrated approach, including clear management frameworks, reporting lines and accountability arrangements focused on responsiveness to mission requirements.

4. Responding to the request by the General Assembly for an annual progress report, to the recommendations and observations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, as endorsed in resolutions 64/269 and 65/289, and to the recommendations of the Special Committee (see A/65/19), the present report provides information on the impact of the strategy and presents a fuller picture of costs, achievements and benchmarks.

5. Implementation efforts have focused on three key aspects: (a) accelerating benefits and introducing efficiencies; (b) introducing, evaluating and reinforcing governance structures; and (c) supporting the shift to the field-focused provision of services.

6. As observed by the Advisory Committee in its report (A/65/743, para. 144) the implementation of the new service delivery model should lead to higher quality of service, streamlined business processes and improved working methods and result in the optimal use of resources and the realization of efficiency, including reduced staffing requirements. Sixteen months into its implementation, the new model has shown results in terms of improved and faster delivery of services to the missions. Given the security environment in many missions, the global field support strategy has reduced the mission footprints by lowering the number of support staff whose work is not location-dependent. Sections IV to VII of the present report provide information on the status of the implementation of the four pillars. In order to achieve the optimal use of resources and realize efficiency gains, including reducing staffing requirements, a functional shift is required that refocuses the efforts of Department of Field Support headquarters, global and regional service centres and field mission support components.

II. Governance and implementation coordination framework

7. The first report of the Secretary-General on progress in the implementation of the global field support strategy set out the governance and management arrangements established to respond to mandated intergovernmental reporting and consultation requirements and to address the needs of field missions and stakeholders (A/65/643, paras. 4 and 5). The Advisory Committee expressed the view that the governance mechanisms put in place constituted a good basis for consultations with Member States and for managing the required change, and its expectation that a fuller assessment would be undertaken with the benefit of further experience (A/65/743, paras. 148 and 149).

8. Senior management of the Department of Field Support has assessed the governance framework created to underpin the implementation of the global field support strategy. The validation of this framework entails the undertaking of regular evaluations with all stakeholders, including field mission directors and chiefs of mission support, in order to gauge its effectiveness. As a result, the leadership of the Department endorsed the established governance framework as effective in managing the implementation of the strategy.

9. In order to strengthen resource stewardship and accountability, key performance indicators are being introduced to support implementation. On the basis of the preliminary work undertaken with the Board of Auditors during its review of the global field support strategy, the leadership of the Department of Field Support decided that the introduction of key performance indicators for the strategy will be expedited and reported on in the context of the third progress report.

10. Furthermore, in accordance with resolution 64/269, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) is conducting an audit of the management of the implementation of the strategy, including its governance structures, to be submitted to the General Assembly at the second part of its resumed sixty-sixth session. The findings of both of those audits will inform the ongoing evaluation of the global field support strategy governance framework. The internal evaluations of the governance framework will be strengthened by the independent audits conducted by OIOS and the Board of Auditors. In terms of next steps, the Department of Field Support will seek the support of OIOS in developing a logical framework model, including the right indicators and data collection methodology.

III. Way forward

11. The next phase of the implementation of the global field support strategy will position the Department of Field Support to strengthen its support for the field by adopting a more comprehensive client-oriented model of end-to-end service provision that horizontally integrates administrative, logistical and information and communications technology services and reflects an evolution away from the prism of these specialist requirements.

12. As a result, Department of Field Support headquarters will increasingly focus on its strategic/oversight roles and on functions involving interactions with Member States, in particular troop- and police-contributing countries, divesting itself of its current transactional, day-to-day activities, as appropriate. The Department will be better positioned to fully deliver on its strategic mandate to conduct integrated

mission support planning and performance measurement in coordination with Secretariat implementing partners. The alignment of the service delivery models of the global field support strategy and the enterprise resource planning project (Umoja) is of fundamental importance. The Department of Field Support will continue to work closely with the Umoja team so as to ensure that the implications of operating under new processes in the Umoja environment and the impact of new staff roles as defined in the Umoja business processes are fully taken into consideration. Alignment will also be sought in the timing of the implementation of the strategy and the deployment of Umoja.

13. In paragraph 24 of his report on the global field support strategy (A/64/633), the Secretary-General noted that the support model proposed did not change the reporting and collaborative frameworks or organizational structures, responsibilities and relationships of Secretariat implementing partners. This tenet was underscored by the General Assembly in resolution 64/269, in which it emphasized the importance of preserving unity of command in missions at all levels as well as coherence in policy and strategy and clear command structures in the field, up to and including at Headquarters.

14. Within the governance framework of the global field support strategy, the strategic role of the Department of Field Support will further evolve so that it works closely with Secretariat implementing partners (specifically, the Department of Management and the Office of Information and Communications Technology) to incorporate their strategies into field-specific implementation plans, while ensuring overall alignment with and adherence to the rules and regulations of the Organization.

15. The global field support strategy support model does not change the reporting and collaboration frameworks of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs; rather, it is designed to improve and strengthen the relationships between the Department of Field Support and those Departments in delivering improved service to the field in support of mission mandates. The integrated operational teams of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will continue to deliver integrated military, rule of law/police, logistics and administrative thematic backstopping support within the context of integrated strategic and operational political guidance. It is envisaged that the Department of Field Support headquarters team will enhance its support to improve interaction with the integrated operational teams to meet those objectives through better functional planning to support the integrated mission planning of the teams.

16. In the case of Department of Political Affairs-led special political missions, the Department of Field Support has established a focal point within the Office of the Under-Secretary-General that will carry out integrated planning and control of special political mission support and backstopping operations within the framework of the service-level agreement between the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Field Support of December 2010. The focal point will consider the projected operations and specific situational context of each field-based special political mission, estimate the total mission support backstopping workload required and develop individual backstopping arrangements tailored to the needs of each mission. The results of the analysis will be used by the Department of Field Support to inform its strategic support plans and requests for backstopping resources, which will be communicated to the General Assembly as part of annual overview reports

and budget submissions. Decisions taken by the General Assembly during the main part of its sixty-sixth session in the context of its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on the review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions (A/66/340), submitted pursuant to resolution 65/259 (sect. XIII, para. 7), will also need to be taken into account in this regard.

17. In proposing the creation of the Department of Field Support, the Secretary-General, in his comprehensive report on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain peace operations (A/61/858 and Corr.1), identified the need to respond to the growth and complexity in United Nations peace activities and operations, highlighting persistent patterns that hindered mandate delivery. In paragraph 12 of the report, referring to strategic management, regular evaluation and review, building a risk management and doctrinal framework of policies, procedures, training and other forms of guidance and preparing qualified, trained staff in all areas, the Secretary-General noted that field missions depended on Headquarters to fulfil such responsibilities, and that when it was unable to do so, the missions suffered greatly. He also noted that a vicious circle continued to be perpetuated whereby Headquarters was overwhelmed with detailed operational issues that should be delegated to the field missions but could not be because they had not been properly equipped to assume such authority. In paragraph 157, the Secretary-General further noted that, notwithstanding their relatively smaller size and scope, special political missions must be seen as a significant additional component of the work of the then-proposed Department of Field Support. Addressing these challenges, the global field support strategy reinforces the division of labour and the relocation of functions on the basis of the organizing principles outlined in the strategy proposal (A/64/633).

18. As instructed by the Advisory Committee and with a view to arriving at an end-state vision, the Department of Field Support is undertaking an analysis of existing functions in order to further clarify and strengthen lines of accountability and responsibility within the Department in accordance with the organizing principles.

19. As a fundamental step in this analysis, OIOS supported the Department of Field Support in a control self-assessment exercise to obtain the views of Department staff in the following areas of strategy implementation: (a) key implementation risks; (b) current controls aimed at mitigating risks; (c) weaknesses or gaps in implementation controls; and (d) the need for additional controls to assess residual risks. OIOS gathered the views and opinions of Department staff, including field staff, through a survey and 70 detailed interviews. An action plan has been defined and is being implemented to address identified risks.

IV. Financial framework

Objectives

20. The financial framework of the global field support strategy strengthens the ability of the Organization to deploy rapidly in challenging circumstances by expediting access to funding, while improving financial management through greater budgetary discipline, delivering an increased capacity to focus on critical start-up activities and strengthened operational integration and accountability. A

standardized funding model was presented to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session (see A/65/696 and Corr.1) for the first year of a mission's operations.

Observations and guidance of the General Assembly

21. The General Assembly, in paragraph 5 of its resolution 65/289, endorsed the recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee (A/65/743), in which the Committee welcomed the Secretary-General's initiative to streamline and rationalize the budgetary process by developing budget proposals for the first year of operation of new start-up missions on the basis of the proposed standardized funding model.

22. In paragraph 90 of its resolution 65/289, the General Assembly recognized the critical role of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and the strategic deployment stocks in rapid mission start-up and expansion, and requested the Secretary-General to provide the Assembly with information on the implementation of paragraphs 8 and 9 of section VI of resolution 64/269.

23. The Advisory Committee viewed the establishment of a more realistic start-up budget proposal, based on what is reasonably achievable in the first year of operation, as a positive development, and agreed that this should lead to a reduced level of unspent balances and improvements in budget implementation rates. The Committee noted that it would offer further comments on the applicability of the standardized funding model and make further recommendations on the content, format and presentation of the first-year budget document in the context of its consideration of the first application of the standardized funding model to a start-up mission. The Committee emphasized that it would be necessary to provide full justification for variances in the context of the budgetary proposals for the second financial period (A/65/743, paras. 206 and 207).

Implementation activities, timelines and monitoring of impact: first application of the standardized funding model to a new start-up mission

24. In its resolution 1996 (2011), the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with an authorized strength of 7,900 uniformed personnel. Pending the presentation of a full budget proposal for the 2011/12 period, initial operations for the period to 31 December 2011 have been supported on an interim basis from funding approved for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) by the General Assembly in its resolution 65/257 B. This full budget proposal, using the standardized funding methodology, is contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/66/532). The option of the standardized funding model profile of 10,000 uniformed personnel, deployed in a large area with significant logistical challenges, was considered to be the most representative of the UNMISS 2011/12 start-up operation.

25. Applying the methodology approved by the Member States, the Secretary-General proposes financial requirements derived from recent start-up missions as the basis of what is achievable in the first year of operations in terms of expenditures. To ensure a comprehensive proposal tailored to the specificities of the UNMISS mandate, the report includes major resource planning assumptions, planned outputs (including results-based-budgeting frameworks) and detailed staffing justifications that are specific to the Mission's requirements. The

methodology provides for standardized funding rather than a standardized resourcing approach.

26. Efforts remain focused on ensuring that UNMISS is supported through sufficient guidance and assistance from Department of Field Support headquarters, including through dedicated mission support visits to sensitize key Mission personnel on the standardized funding methodology, support the establishment of resource management systems aligned with the new approach and define key resourcing assumptions within the framework of the model.

Achievements and next steps

27. Lessons learned during the implementation period for the standardized funding model in UNMISS are currently being captured, and a full evaluation will be undertaken at the end of the 2011/12 period. The results will be reported in the next progress report on the global field support strategy and will inform future applications of the model.

28. Early observations suggest that the model has contributed positively to the start-up environment, allowing for the rapid presentation of funding for the full year, immediate emphasis on budgetary discipline and the alignment of resources with a limited funding envelope. By streamlining the efforts to develop a first-year budget submission, Mission personnel are refocusing on managing the establishment and transition of the related missions, UNMIS, UNMISS and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.

29. The guidance of the Advisory Committee and the General Assembly will be critical, in particular so as to ensure that the requirements for the presentation of start-up budgets are appropriate, given the planning needed to establish full staffing requirements up front (as in the case of UNMISS).

30. Building on the experiences of this pilot, funding models for other phases of a mission life cycle will be developed, possibly starting with the drawdown and liquidation of missions and the start-up of special political missions.

31. In moving forward, focused efforts on streamlining the process by which the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund can be replenished in a manner that supports new and expanding missions while maintaining the highest standards of accountability and stewardship of funding will be pursued.

V. Predefined modules and service packages

Objectives

32. The modularization concept is designed to provide the Organization with the capacity to build up field facilities by leveraging a range of individual basic modules that can be configured to address the specific requirements of different deployments. In accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 64/269, the development of predefined modules and service packages to improve the quality and expedite the delivery of services to field missions, including civilian response capacities, is occurring in close consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries. Members of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations guided progress and underscored the need for modularization to be operationally focused.

Through iterative bimonthly briefings that began in July 2010, members of the Special Committee provide a framework for the development of predefined service packages and modules that emphasize simplicity, cost-effectiveness, flexibility, scalability, portability and mobility.

33. Under this framework, modules are pre-kitted assemblies of standardized components designed to provide a functional capability (for example, security, accommodation, power generation and so forth). A combination of these modules packaged together and delivered by an enabling capability results in a service package that forms a functional element of a mission's infrastructure. Modules are the smallest units of support elements that can be assigned either as components of a service package or as stand-alone sets required for building peacekeeping facilities. The necessary flexibility in design and composition is built in to deliver adaptable solutions that can be modified according to the on-site realities of differing deployments.

Observations and guidance of the General Assembly

34. In its consideration of the first progress report on the global field support strategy (A/65/643), the General Assembly recalled paragraph 157 of the report of the Advisory Committee (A/65/743), in which the Committee welcomed the overall progress in the area of predefined modules and service packages and recommended that an assessment be made of the implementation of the first module for a 200-person camp to determine whether the desired goals were being achieved, including improvements in quality and timeliness of service delivery to field missions, and provide more details on cost savings and resource requirements, as well as any unforeseen impact.

35. In the context of its review of the first progress report, the General Assembly, in its resolution 65/310, endorsed the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in which the Committee took into consideration the fact that the first module prototype would be available by June 2011 (phase IA module) and requested the Secretariat to include in the bimonthly briefing the confirmed phase IA of the modularization concept (A/65/19, para. 222).

Implementation activities, timeline and monitoring of impact

36. In accordance with requests of the General Assembly, the implementation activities focused on: (a) achieving the goals identified in the modularization timeline presented in annex I to the report of the Secretary-General (A/65/643); (b) defining key performance indicators and high-level costs estimates for the full project based on the initial analysis of impact; and (c) reviewing and finalizing the five-year timeline for full implementation.

Assessment of the implementation of the first module for a 200-person camp and lessons learned

37. After validation by Member States, implementing partners and field mission specialists, the first modules were made available in June 2011. This benchmark, having been met, an initial assessment of the modules for the 200-person camp showed that reductions in investments in inventories were viable through the standardization afforded by modules. Improved facilities design simplifies maintenance and lower operating costs without having a negative impact on

working and living conditions. Once modularized camps have been introduced into the field, they will provide the baseline against which the effectiveness of a future generation of camps will be assessed.

38. The camp layout and multipurpose design will yield a smaller footprint with better living and working conditions, while introducing important security features, reducing the impact on the environment (for example, wastewater and solid waste treatment in situ and the use of resource-efficient technologies with lower greenhouse gas emissions, such as solar panels, wind farms and biogas). The smaller physical footprint achieved through the co-location of functions and units offers opportunities for consolidating information and communications technology systems and reducing utilities infrastructure and physical movements of personnel and material. With additional experience, further evaluations will be undertaken and the results reported.

39. The design of the 200-person camp and the five-year modularization implementation plan have been completed. An expression of interest notice for enabling capacity has been published. A scope of work for the 200-person camp enabling capacity and services has been programmed for the first quarter of 2012. Several modules (staff accommodation, power supply, waste management, water supply and welfare) are being piloted in the UNMISS start-up. This pilot is being implemented in the new Mission headquarters, to be expanded to regional and county support bases.

Estimates of cost savings and resource requirements

40. **Planning costs**. The cost of prototyping is estimated at $50,000 for items to be utilized in modification and testing during the five-year course of the project. Finalized prototypes will be deployed to the field, off-setting this initial investment cost. The cost of conducting three ballistic tests on hardened structures is estimated at $150,000. On the basis of the pre-global field support strategy experience in constructing high-security shelters in Iraq, it is estimated that the related savings will more than make up for the aforementioned costs in future projected deployments (the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA)). Detailed analysis is being conducted.

41. As indicated in the report of the Secretary-General (A/64/633, para. 65), the work of modularizing certain functions into service packages and establishing product sheets and usage instructions will be launched through a review of the strategic deployment stocks and the systems contracts currently available. The configuration of strategic deployment stocks into modules will optimize their usage and mitigate the risk of ageing and obsolete inventory through improved planning. The benefits of modularization are estimated to be much greater than the need to reduce current holdings. With a view to the realization of these benefits, it is proposed that the responsibility for the establishment, replenishment and rotation of strategic deployment stocks, including planning, procedure development and monitoring, be relocated to the Global Service Centre at Brindisi, Italy.

42. **Logistics savings**. The modularization programme is designed to improve planning and forecasting, particularly for start-up or surge requirements. It is designed to mitigate the need for urgent shipping for field deployment resulting

from less-than-optimal material requirement planning. It is estimated, for example, that over the next three-year cycle, a minimum of eight emergency flights to transport material will be rendered unnecessary, resulting in projected savings of $2.8 million.

43. The modularization programme has developed a replicable methodology for the repurposing of containers to provide office and living accommodations adaptable to the security and other environmental conditions, in particular in the start-up/surge phase. Current planning estimates indicate that as a result of this programme, the shipping of approximately 200 sea containers containing prefabricated structures will be rendered unnecessary, yielding savings in sea freight of approximately $1 million.[1]

44. **Installation savings**. Missions are responsible for the implementation of service packages in the field. The enabling capacities developed in the context of the modularization project work under a mission's auspices. Quantifiable benefits are achieved in terms of personnel that a mission does not need to employ in the start-up or surge phases or retain once the mission infrastructure has been built. For example, the initial estimate for a reduction of 30 Field Service staff (at a yearly rate of $150,000) would yield a projected savings of $4.5 million. The estimated cost of the already existing team of 30 Global Service Centre mission support functional experts trained and organized to perform this function is approximately $50,000 a year for mission infrastructure development — factoring in daily subsistence allowance/travel and replacement costs would result in a total cost of $1.5 million. Thus, there would be a net annual benefit of $3 million.

Table 1
Key performance indicators for missions

Goal	*Output*	*Key performance indicator*
• Rapidly deploy missions, facilities and infrastructure	Implemented modularized service packages	Number of service packages and modules deployed per financial year
• Effective use of mission resources in support of deploying facilities	Mission support teams implementing service package installation	Number of mission support teams utilized per financial year in support of intra-mission or inter-mission service package deployments

[1] Estimate derived from number of sea containers from three missions (the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia) with 20 per cent yield (6,000 containers, of which 20 per cent would be converted to 1,200 individual accommodations, replacing 200 three-module prefabricated structures with similar area as a shared accommodation).

Goal	*Output*	*Key performance indicator*
• Reduced dependency on fuel and vulnerability	Increased use of alternative energy sources and the reduction of fuel consumption	Percentage of energy generated by alternative sources; net decrease in monthly fuel use

Note: Actual value for the key performance indicators will be developed for each mission in accordance with the particular mission realities on the ground and deployment requirements.

Table 2
Key performance indicators for the Department of Field Support

Goal	*Output*	*Key performance indicator*
• Rationalize strategic deployment stocks	Increased turnover of strategic deployment stocks	(Strategic deployment stocks reporting) number of strategic deployment stock turnovers per management category per year
• Align strategic deployment stocks to meet modularization requirement	Revision of strategic deployment stock composition and systems contracts	Percentage of strategic deployment stock line items aligned with modularization which are covered by systems contracts
• Rapidly deploy missions, facilities and infrastructure	Timely authorization for the release of strategic deployment stocks as service packages/ modules	Authority to release issue within 72 hours from request or mandate, per instruction

Table 3
Key performance indicators for the Global Service Centre

Goal	*Output*	*Key performance indicator*
• Readiness of strategic deployment stocks to support modularization	Strategic deployment stock inventory reconfigured and prepared to meet modularization requirement	Readiness to deploy equivalent of 5 x 200-person camps and 50-person expeditionary kit

Goal	*Output*	*Key performance indicator*
• **Establish training package for mission support teams**	**Quarterly training for mission support team staff on modularization and service packages**	**80 staff of missions and Global Service Centre trained per financial year**
• Ensure the quality of new modularization standardized components	Testing and prototyping of security structures and accommodation units	One ballistic test conducted and two modifications prepared per financial year

Table 4
Key performance indicators for the modularization pillar

Goal	*Output*	*Key performance indicator*
• Availability of service package designs	Design of modular service packages as per plan	2 service packages developed or revised per financial year
• Developed enabling capability	Scopes of work for external enablers complementing service package development	2 scopes of work developed per financial year
• Establish mission support team capability	Mission support teams developed, trained and functional	3 mission support team rosters established with trained team leaders per financial year

Note: Revision of strategic deployment stocks according to the requirements of the modularization pillar is being developed by the modularization team.

Modularization: five-year plan

45. Modularization will include the following service packages:

(a) 200-person camp: a medium-sized camp designed to fit into a 260m^2 (6.7 ha) area which can contain variants of each identified module, including accommodation for military, police and civilians or a combination of all three components, with offices and other service installations. The design package of the 1-B 200-person camp has been completed;

(b) 1,000-person base: a large-sized camp designed for an area of 25 ha to accommodate a full battalion and its support elements. This design can be configured to serve as a mission or sector headquarters;

(c) 50-person outpost: a location to accommodate troop- or police-contributing countries at platoon strength with additional elements or an observer group, on a 0.67-ha site;

(d) Expeditionary: a preparatory camp for a civilian or observer group planning for a major or protracted operation either in situ or elsewhere. The packaging size of all elements can be handled by two persons (maximum 40 kg per component). The expeditionary kits are fully scalable;

(e) Logistics base: a combination of modules catering to the functional requirement of a logistics base. The service package is configured to provide accommodation for logistics staff and support elements of the base;

(f) Airbase: a package meeting the functional requirements of a small airport enabled to handle fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, as well as accommodation for staff and support elements. The specialized equipment of an airbase is proposed as an externally sourced capability.

Achievements and next steps

46. The five-year modularization plan comprises three phases. Each phase involves a review of the product offerings, holdings of strategic deployment stocks and enabling capacities, including system contracts. Four generations (A, B, C and D versions) of the service packages are planned.

Phase 1

47. The achievements of phase 1, which commenced in July 2010, are as follows:

(a) Designs for the first generation 1-A 200-person camp and refined 1-B 200-person camp;

(b) Phase 1-A module available in June 2011 as planned;

(c) Two projects (specialized shelter and 1-B modular 200-person camp) being deployed to UNIFIL;

(d) Several modular projects under development for UNSOA using the 1-A modules, including high-security infrastructures;

(e) Two projects for modular high-security warehouse and specialized shelter being developed for UNAMI;

(f) 200-person kitchen modules set for deployment to UNAMI;

(g) Two wastewater plant modules prepared for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force;

(h) Initial concept design for the 1000-person base camp, the 50-person outpost and the definition of the expeditionary package;

(i) 19 modules designed to make up the 200-person camp product;

(j) Mission support teams established and trained.

Phase 2

48. Phase 2 includes the development of new service packages, including the logistics base and airfield base; Geographic Information System and Public Information Office modules; the expeditionary module; prototypes for the utilization of modified containers as office and living accommodation, ablution units, high-security shelters and guard towers; ballistics tests on the high-security shelter to

confirm the safety of the design; review of the strategic deployment stocks composition to align it with the identified modules; and the further development of mission support teams.

49. Eleven expression of interest notices were issued to invite Member States and the private sector to express their interest: supplying external enabling capabilities. A statement of work is being developed. During the first quarter of 2012, a request for proposal will be issued with a view to the provision of enabling capabilities. The implementation of the modularization concept will allow for the procurement of smaller, discrete components to increase the number of capable suppliers and increase competition.

Phase 3

50. Phase 3 will see the design of 1C and 1D versions of the 200-person camp, 50-person outpost, 1,000-person base, air base and logistics base, incorporating lessons learned from the implementation of previous versions. During this phase, a review will assess the need for alternative packages and additional modules. By the end of phase 3, systems contracts will have been revised on the basis of (a) the updated designs of the packages and modules; (b) new technologies; and (c) experience gained during the four years of the project, coupled with ongoing regular consultations and feedback from Member States.

51. An updated timeline for modularization is provided in the annex to the present report.

VI. Service centres

A. Global Service Centre

Objectives

52. With regard to the reprofiling of the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, as the Global Service Centre, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, in paragraph 163 of its report (A/65/743), observed that the submission of a more detailed proposal was needed in order to enable Member States to have a more complete picture of the envisaged configuration of the Centre and its relationship with Headquarters, as well as a better understanding of the Secretary-General's new service delivery model and the operational role that could be played by the Centre. Such a proposal would also serve as a road map for following up on progress towards the future direction of the Centre during the implementation of the different phases of the reprofiling and mapping exercises. The present report responds to this request in outlining the functional structure of the Global Service Centre.

53. The Global Service Centre is a unified concept: it would be deployed in two locations, Brindisi, Italy, and Valencia, Spain. Its end-state will be achieved through: (a) leveraging existing infrastructure and (b) integrating existing capacities in the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi and the United Nations Support Base at Valencia through the transfer of functions and related posts from the Department of Field Support headquarters.

54. The functional structure of the Global Service Centre is based on two main capacities: support services and supply-chain management. Resolution 65/289 (para. 86) recalled paragraphs 12 and 14 of section VI of resolution 64/269, in which the Assembly recognized that delivering modularized service packages at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi was aimed at enhancing the operational effectiveness of field missions. Stressing the importance of proceeding in that regard, the Assembly decided that the Global Service Centre at Brindisi would configure and manage global service packages. Thus the investments already made in the United Nations Logistics Base would be leveraged as the Base is reprofiled as the centre for the delivery of service expertise to the field in the areas of logistics and information and communications technology, including the delivery of integrated supply-chain management and modularization. Likewise, it is proposed that the investments made in the United Nations Support Base at Valencia be leveraged so that, in addition to serving as a secondary active telecommunications site for disaster recovery and enterprise data centre, it will become a centre for service expertise in the areas of field personnel management and field budget and finance. Through this approach, the Global Service Centre will assume operational and transactional functions currently performed by the Department of Field Support headquarters and enable the Department to consolidate its focus on the provision of strategic direction, oversight and policy guidance with Secretariat implementing partners. The Global Service Centre will serve as the operational arm of the Department of Field Support headquarters and thereby mitigate the tendency of the headquarters to focus too closely on detailed operational issues to the detriment of more strategic, longer-term priorities. These detailed operational issues can be delegated and better managed by the Global Service Centre so as to improve service delivery to the field. A description of the functions proposed for transfer in order to accomplish this objective is contained in paragraph 57 below.

Observations and guidance of the General Assembly

55. The transformation is being achieved while ensuring adherence to paragraph 87 of resolution 65/289, in which the Assembly reaffirmed paragraph 16 of section VI of resolution 64/269, in which it stressed that functions primarily involving interactions with Member States, particularly troop-contributing countries, would continue to be located at Headquarters. To ensure that this is the case, specific proposals on functions and resources to be transferred to the Global Service Centre (United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi or United Nations Support Base at Valencia) are presented in the context of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the budget of the United Nations Logistics Base for 2012/13, for the consideration of the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session.

Implementation activities, timeline and monitoring of impact

56. In its resolution 65/291, the General Assembly endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee (A/65/743/Add.12). The Committee recommended approval of the Secretary-General's approach to reprofiling the Brindisi Base as the Global Service Centre and considered that the consolidation and streamlining of structures made it an opportune time for reviewing administrative processes, eliminating inefficient and duplicative procedures and improving methods of work. To this end, the Global Service Centre focused its implementation activities in Brindisi on the completion of the reprofiling plan in

accordance with the timeline presented by the Secretary-General (A/65/743/Add.12, annex III). Implementation activities are described in detail in the budget proposal for the United Nations Logistics Base for 2012/13.

Achievements and next steps

57. Proposals for processes and functions for transfer to the Global Service Centre are set out in the proposed budgets for the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base for 2012/13, and include: (a) global asset and material management for engineering supply and surface transport; (b) mission operational support; (c) strategic deployment stocks; (d) mission liquidation team; (e) recruitment for the Field Personnel Division; and (f) capacity-building.

58. Specific posts to be transferred to the Global Service Centre, as well as details regarding next steps according to the timeline for the reprofiling of the United Nations Logistics Base as the Global Service Centre included in annex II to the report of the Advisory Committee (A/65/743/Add.12), will be presented in the proposed budgets for the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base for 2012/13.

B. Regional Service Centre at Entebbe

Objectives

59. By its resolution 64/269 (para. 17), the General Assembly decided to establish the Regional Service Centre at the logistics hub at Entebbe, Uganda, with the functions proposed by the Secretary-General (see A/64/660, annex IX). The Regional Service Centre at Entebbe consolidates routine back-office transactional support functions for the regional missions it serves. The participating missions include the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), UNMISS, UNISFA, UNSOA, the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). The Assembly stressed that the establishment of the Regional Service Centre must respect the principle of separate financial arrangements for missions and that its resources and the volume of its activities were scalable, reflecting the start-up, expansion, drawdown or closure of the field missions served. The Assembly also stressed that the staffing of the Centre would be achieved mainly through redeployment from field missions. Accordingly, the posts, positions and related costs of the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe are reflected in the respective budget proposals of the participating missions on a yearly basis.

60. The Advisory Committee, in paragraph 148 of its report (A/64/660), recommended that the Secretary-General proceed progressively with back-office service delivery at the Regional Service Centre in the first year of implementation in order to gain experience with the provision of common services on a multimission basis. The Committee also recommended that the Secretary-General elaborate a plan for the further development of back-office functions based on lessons learned, taking into account the potential benefits and impact on the operations of field missions, as well as start-up and other costs.

Observations and guidance of the General Assembly

61. In paragraph 89 of its resolution 65/289, the General Assembly noted the results achieved to date in enhancing effective service delivery through the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe. The Advisory Committee recommended that an assessment of the first phase of the transfer of functions to the Centre be undertaken in the context of the second progress report, to include details of improvements in the quality of service delivery, efficiency gains and cost savings, as well as information on the consolidation of posts (A/65/743, para. 175).

62. The Advisory Committee emphasised that the present report should provide information on the efficiency gains and economies of scale expected through the consolidation and centralized provision of back-office functions through a shared service centre, with benchmarks and baseline information (A/65/743, para. 177). The General Assembly, in paragraph 88 of its resolution 65/289, noted with appreciation the performance of the Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre.

63. The General Assembly, in paragraph 91 of resolution 65/289, requested the Secretary-General, on an annual basis and in a consolidated manner, to provide information on the financial and human resources provided by client missions to the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe and on the shares of the resource requirements for the individual client missions provided in their respective budget proposals, as well as information on the vacancy rates, expenditures and budget performance of the Centre. This information is presented in a separate report for the consideration of the General Assembly.

Implementation activities, timeline and monitoring of impact

64. As noted in the first report of the Secretary-General on progress in implementation of the global field support strategy (A/65/643, para. 48), the implementation of the Regional Service Centre is envisaged in two phases. The first, initiated 1 July 2010, focused on the establishment of a governance framework and the integration into the Centre of various existing pilot projects (including check-in and check-out processing, education grant processing for the participating missions, the operation of a regional training and conference centre and the Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre). Phase II, initiated on 1 July 2011, is ongoing and is focused on incorporating the identified functions to support the Centre in improving service delivery and achieving economies of scale. Phase II prioritizes the analysis of financial and human resources processes, while the business cases for information and communications technology regionalism, regional property management, archiving and records management and regional medical services are being finalized for consideration of the Regional Service Centre Steering Committee.

65. The Regional Service Centre Steering Committee has defined business continuity as first priority for phase II; in that regard, the Centre has adopted a six-step process in which stakeholder missions and the Department of Field Support headquarters are actively engaged. The steps are set out below:

(a) Assessment: first level of evaluation in the transition process. Possible functions for transfer to the Regional Service Centre are identified through the application of the global field support strategy standard project methodology to

arrive at business cases that include feasibility and risk analysis, as well as timelines for the evaluation of the Regional Service Centre Steering Committee;

(b) Absorption: clusters group functions together in common facilities. Mission functions and personnel are moved to the Regional Service Centre and continue to conduct business as they did in the mission. Each mission function, a cluster, is co-located with similar clusters (e.g., co-location of UNMISS payroll with MONUSCO payroll);

(c) Rationalization: establishes targets and baselines and, once similar clusters have been co-located in the Regional Service Centre, identifies and eliminates duplication and reduces latencies. Results in an initial reduction in posts and refocuses resources for process re-engineering;

(d) Integration: combines function elements, standardizes processes and practices, enhances and develops capacity and prepares for re-engineering;

(e) Re-engineering: reworks functions, systems, processes and practices, establishes key performance indicators and targets, and defines risk mitigation actions. Involves the major transition to new systems, processes and practices, prioritizing International Public Sector Accounting Standards and Umoja alignments, which are key to optimizing efficiencies and service delivery;

(f) Continuous improvement: establishes processes for ongoing service improvements, refinements, efficiencies and enhancements.

66. Phase I projects are at the re-engineering step. Baselines and key performance indicators have been established and processes have been redesigned for optimization. Phase II projects are at the absorption step. A communications strategy is being developed to assist the process. UNMISS elements in the process of being absorbed by the Regional Service Centre include finance (aspects of field-based payroll, payments, cashier and accounts) and human resources (international recruitment, post management, time and attendance). Workshops for the finance and human resources components of MONUSCO and UNAMID are currently under way to facilitate the movement of those functions to the Centre.

67. The rationalization and integration steps for the finance and human resources functions of MONUSCO, UNMISS and UNAMID are expected to be completed by June 2012. Planning for the re-engineering step for those functions will begin in early to mid-2012; the re-engineering step of the finance and human resources functions is planned for the 2012/13 financial period.

Achievements and next steps

Improvements in service to the missions

68. Check-in/check-out processing is now electronic and uses the first version of the Field Support Suite system module. During the period 2010/11, there were 171 check-ins and 718 check-outs of MONUSCO personnel. This process has been benchmarked against key performance indicators (see table 5).

Table 5
Key performance indicators for check-in/check-out functions
(Percentage)

Key performance indicators	*To July 2010*	*July 2010-June 2011*	*July-September 2011*
Check-ins: 98 per cent completed in 2 days	>95	>98	>98
International check-outs: 98 per cent completed in 1 day	>95	>98	>98
Military check-outs: 98 per cent completed in 3 days	>98	>98	>98

69. The Education Grant Unit processes requests for UNAMID, MONUSCO, BNUB, UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) (now liquidated), BINUCA, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, UNSOA and non-regional service centre missions (including the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the United Nations Office to the African Union) in an effort to harmonize services within geographical locations. During 2010/11, the Unit received 4,120 requests from missions supported by the Regional Service Centre and 1,096 from other missions, for a total of 5,216 education grant requests. During the re-engineering step, the required analyses are being undertaken to evaluate the integration of education grant processing in the Global Service Centre. This process has been benchmarked against key performance indicators (see table 6).

Table 6
Key performance indicators for education grant functions
(Percentage)

Key performance indicators	*To July 2010*	*July 2010-June 2011*	*July-September 2011*
Processing time peak period (July-Oct): 96 per cent of claims completed in 7 weeks	Average weeks 11	>96	>96
Processing time peak period (July-Oct): 96 per cent of claims completed in 7 weeks	Not available	>96	Not available
Average number of claims returned to mission: <15 per cent	Average: 40	Average: 25	Average: 25

70. During the 2010/11 period, the Regional Training and Conference Centre delivered training to 2,604 participants. This process has been benchmarked against key performance indicators and an automated client satisfaction survey has been implemented to capture the data (see table 7).

Table 7
Key performance indicators for Regional Training and Conference Centre functions
(Percentage)

Key performance indicators	*To July 2010*	*July 2010-June 2011*	*July-September 2011*
Response to training requests received: 98 per cent in 24 hours	98	98	98
Conference/course coordinators and trainers satisfaction: 70 per cent approval	98.20	97.70	98.80

71. During the 2010/11 period, the Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre oversaw 37 rotations for MINURCAT, MONUSCO, UNOCI, UNAMID, UNIFIL and UNMIS. This process has been benchmarked against key performance indicators (see table 8).

Table 8
Key performance indicators for Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre functions
(Percentage)

Key performance indicators	*To July 2010*	*July 2010-June 2011*	*July-September 2011*
Response to client requests: 98 per cent completed in 1 day	>98	>98	>98
Troop deployment, rotations and repatriation requests: planning >30 days prior to move	>30 days	>30 days	>30 days
Other deployment requests: 95 per cent completed in 5 days	>95	>95	>95

Efficiencies

72. The Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre achieved two types of savings for the fiscal period 2010/11 through the coordination of air asset utilization. The first relates to the centralized planning of troop rotations, which allows the use of long-term charters as opposed to short-term charters. The use of long-term charters allows for additional flexibility in the planning of rotations. Savings are set out in table 9.

Table 9
Savings achieved by the Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre: optimized troop rotations
(Thousands of United States dollars)

	UNAMID	*UNMISS*	*MONUSCO*	*MINURCAT*	*Others*	*Total*
Short-term charters	3 044.60	468.40	2 092.10	4 743.10	244.00	10 592.20
Long-term charters	2 421.70	485.00	2 004.80	1 983.40	244.00	7 138.90
Savings	**622.90**	**16.60**	**87.30**	**2 759.70**	—	**3 453.30**

73. The second type of savings achieved by the Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre relates to the optimization of air assets. The savings realized to June 2011 are shown in table 10.

Table 10
Savings achieved by the Transportation and Movements Integrated Control Centre: optimization of air assets
(United States dollars)

Mission	*Aircraft*	*Amount*
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo/ United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1xDash 8	3 600 000
	1xBeachcraft1900	2 100 000
	1xLearjet	3 800 000
	1xAn24	1 600 000
	2xMI-26	10 500 000
	1xIL-76	4 200 000
	1xL-382	3 900 000
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	1xCRJ	2 900 000
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	1xL382/C130	7 900 000
	1xIL76	3 700 000
	5xrotary wing	5 600 000
	1xMD-83 (6 mo.)	3 600 000
United Nations Mission in the Sudan	1xC-130	7 900 000
Total	**18 aircraft**	**61 300 000**

74. The transfer of functions to the Regional Service Centre allows for savings associated with the status of Entebbe as a family duty station, as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 65/248. Table 11 summarizes the savings associated with transfers to be finalized by June 2012.

Table 11
Savings associated with the hosting of finance and human resources functions in a family duty station
(United States dollars)

Mission	*Total international posts transferred*	*Annualized one-time installation cost (five years)*	*Annualized savings (family duty station)*	*Additional costs*	*Total savings*
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	37	80 546	1 115 836	299 990	735 300
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	32	74 275	1 570 186	226 240	1 269 671
United Nations Mission in South Sudan	47	109 073	1 665 953	332 290	1 224 590
Total	**116**	**263 894**	**4 351 975**	**858 520**	**3 229 561**

75. As a result of the implementation of the rationalization step described above (para. 65 (c)), a 10 per cent reduction in posts can be achieved. Reductions for the current cycle (19 posts) are presented in the budget submissions of the participating missions for 2012/13.

76. The centralization of transactional functions in the Regional Service Centre as a family duty station also affords an increase in productivity associated with the rest and recreation cycles. Table 12 presents the impact for the 116 international posts being transferred. The net impact is equivalent to a 10.5 per cent increase in available resources. There is also a benefit associated with the continuity of staff in a job. This increased productivity will be utilized to reassign staff in order to perform the integration, re-engineering and continuous improvement steps (see para. 65 (f) above) without the need for additional resources. Once the steps have been finalized, additional post savings will be achieved including as a result of productivity gains.

Table 12
Productivity increase associated with the absence of rest and recreation in a family duty station, expressed in full-time equivalent

	International posts	*Rest and recreation cycle*	*Rest and recreation days*	*Annual cycle rate*	*Annual rest and recreation days*	*Total days savings*	***Full-time equivalent***
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	37	8	5	4.5	22.5	832	**3.2**
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	32	6	5	6	30	960	**3.7**
United Nations Mission in South Sudan	47	6	5	6	30	1 410	**5.4**
Total	**116**					**3 202**	**12.3**

Full implementation of the service delivery model: regional service centres for West Africa and the Middle East

77. The regional service centre model represents a response to the requirement to empower the field to undertake operational service delivery through a mechanism that addresses the limitations inherent in the austere deployment conditions under which the majority of field missions exist, while ensuring adherence to the existing command and control structures. As such, regional service centres represent not an additional layer between the field missions and Department of Field Support headquarters, but an operational arrangement by which missions with regional proximity can physically co-locate staff performing operational and transactional functions that do not need to be performed in situ in the missions. The aim is to achieve economies of scale and efficiencies while minimizing mission footprints. The regional service centre model is designed to maintain mission chain-of-command, while affording directors and chiefs of mission support a mechanism with which to deliver timely and effective service in a manner that also reduces their administrative burden in situ by obviating the need for each mission to create stand-alone structures, and to house and support these staff, given limited mission infrastructure and mission security environments. Service-level agreements between the participating missions and the Regional Service Centre set out service delivery requirements. This pooling of regional resources yields both management efficiencies and cost reductions. By linking the Regional Service Centre directly with the budgets of the missions it serves, the chief of the Centre is structurally motivated to deliver improved service while ensuring the optimized use of mission resources.

78. In its resolution 65/289, the General Assembly noted the results achieved to date in enhancing effective service delivery through the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe (para. 89). Given the positive impact of the establishment of the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe, the end-state vision for the global field support strategy includes the full support model implementation by which geographically related missions will all be served by similar Regional Service Centres. The establishment of two additional such centres to serve missions in the regions of West Africa and the Middle East is proposed.

79. The proposals for new regional service centres to support missions in West Africa and the Middle East adhere to the directives given by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/269 (sect. VI, paras. 22, 23 and 25), in which the Assembly stressed that the establishment of such a centre must respect the principle of separate financial arrangements for missions and that its resources and the volume of its activities are scalable, reflecting the start-up, expansion, drawdown or closure of the field missions that it serves, and requested the Secretary-General, when developing budget proposals for the missions to be served by a regional service centre, to reflect the posts, positions and related costs of such a Centre in the respective budget proposals, including the results-based-budgeting framework, and to present more than one option for any future proposed regional service centres for the consideration and approval of the General Assembly.

80. Table 13 provides a proposed support breakdown. Should the establishment of these two centres be endorsed in principle by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General will seek proposals from Member States through established mechanisms in

order to ensure full transparency and optimal results in the site selection process in conformity with criteria set forth by the General Assembly.

Table 13
Proposed mission breakdown for regional service centres to support missions in West Africa and the Middle East

Mission	*Support staff*	*Budget (millions of United States dollars)*
Middle East		
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	1 850	545.5
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	940	270.0
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	976	201.5
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	382	69.7
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	236	56.5
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	290	50.6
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	142	22.8
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process	46	9.3
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	32	9.0
Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus	6	3.4
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	17	3.1
	4 917	**1 241.4**
West Africa		
United Nations Mission in Liberia	2 067	525.6
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	1 380	486.7
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	389	61.4
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo[a]	362	44.9
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone	62	16.6
Cameroon/Nigeria Mixed Commission	7	8.7
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau	60	18.4
United Nations Office for West Africa	68	7.7
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa	17	3.5
	4 412	**1 173.5**

Note: Includes operations led by the Department of Political Affairs.

[a] Servicing of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo still to be determined.

VII. Human resources framework

Objectives

81. The human resources framework of the global field support strategy will establish a workforce trends analysis capability to address gaps in field deployment and will introduce a more strategic service delivery model to improve field recruitment and succession planning.

Implementation activities, timeline, monitoring of impact, achievements and next steps

82. Progress has been made in the following areas:

(a) Workforce planning and outreach: a benchmarking exercise to determine standard requirements was conducted. More than 145,000 applications for existing and projected job openings were received (April 2010-July 2011). Targeted outreach efforts to address disparities in terms of the representation of women, underrepresented countries, and troop- and police-contributing countries gathered pace. Efforts to address these imbalances included an increase in the size of the network of governmental and professional organizations from 300 to 800;

(b) Recruitment and selection: centrally managed staffing develops rosters of qualified candidates for existing and projected vacancies vetted by a central review body and available for immediate selection by field missions. More than 4,200 candidates were added to standby rosters in the reporting period. As at 1 November 2011, 347 generic and mission-specific job openings were advertised. Approximately 8,900 roster clearances across 24 job families were made, doubling previous totals. In 2011, a major campaign was launched for job openings in the international Field Service category. More than 27,000 applications were received for 16 generic job openings in eight job families. The field central review body reduced the average number of days required to process a case from 68 (1 July 2009-30 June 2010) to 35 days (1 July 2010-30 June 2011). As reform in the area of human resources continues, a positive trend in the reduction of vacancy rates[2] from 23.5 per cent in June 2009 to 18 per cent in June 2011 has been achieved. While progress is being made in the implementation of the roster management system, delays in some job families need to be addressed. The Department of Field Support will evaluate with implementing partners the current roster management system to identify areas for further process improvements and streamlining;

(c) Succession management: to further develop succession- and talent-management capacities, the Department of Field Support launched, together with eCornell, a certification programme for human resources field and Headquarters practitioners; approximately 300 human resources practitioners enrolled. In addition, the "Guide for managers to address and resolve poor performance" serves as a resource to shape the future workforce;

(d) Conditions of service: the introduction on 1 July 2011 of a non-family hardship allowance ensures that staff members serving in non-family duty stations receive an additional amount in recognition of the increased level of financial and

[2] Vacancy rates represent average vacancy rates of all aggregated mission posts for internationally recruited staff.

psychological hardship resulting from involuntary separation from families and additional costs related to such service;

(e) **Business intelligence (analysis and reporting): new detailed data and analytical reports on roster-based recruitment, turnover analysis and gender balance, together with enhanced reports on vacancy rates by mission and job families,** facilitate the analysis of critical job openings;

(f) Customer service integration: working in close coordination with the Office of Human Resources Management, additional authorities were delegated to missions, including: full appointment, selection and recruitment authority, extension of appointment and additional operational authorities (for example, special post allowance, special leave without pay, rental subsidy, travel of staff members and dependants). Subject to the General Assembly's approval of proposals for transfer from Department of Field Support headquarters (Field Personnel Division), to the Global Service Centre, additional delegations of authority would be sought to support the Centre;

(g) Governance and organizational performance: as part of the revised governance and organizational performance structure described in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Overview of human resources management reform" (A/65/305), the human resources management scorecard was introduced, effective 1 July 2011. It focuses senior management on strategic priorities, and measures the performance of departments, offices and missions in terms of their human resources functions.

VIII. Conclusions and next steps

83. The global field support strategy continues to support the evolution of the Department of Field Support through a change-management process to arrive at a functional end-to-end service delivery model. The Department is positioned to deliver the benefits of this model. While the momentum to implement the four pillars will be maintained, further strategic development will be concentrated on supporting this transformation in a phased manner. Risk analysis will continue to underpin the transformation process so that continuity of service delivery is not compromised but continually enhanced.

IX. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

84. **The General Assembly is requested to:**

(a) **Take note of the present report;**

(b) **Endorse the concept of regional service centres for missions in West Africa and the Middle East, in accordance with the General Assembly's directives in its resolution 64/269 (paras. 22, 23 and 25);**

(c) **Request the Secretary-General to seek proposals from Member States through established mechanisms in order to ensure full transparency and optimal results in the site selection process, to be presented to the Assembly for its approval in the context of its sixty-seventh session.**

Annex

Updated timeline for modularization

C-34 bimonthly briefings, workshops, progress reporting for C34, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, support account and Global Service Centre budgets

Modularization working group, technical experts group and sub-working groups meetings, workshops and seminars


Modularization programme concepts and modalities defined
1A 200-man camp design
1B 200-man camp design
Design of Phase II starts
1B 1000-man base, 50-man outpost designs, expeditionary concept
Phase II designs: Port, Airport, Terminals, Services, Catering, Communications
1C 200-man camp design
1C 1000-man base, 50-man outpost designs
Revised expeditionary concept
Phase II Service Packages' design revised to IIC
1D 200-man camp design
1D 1000-man base, 50-man outpost designs
01 July 2010
01 July 2011
01 July 2012
01 July 2013
01 July 2014
01 July 2015
UN enablers; Mission Support Teams (MST) established at UNLB/GSC, rostered and operational
1A -1000-man base, 50-man outpost designs
Expression of Interest for member states' and commercial enablers ::
Review of SDS composition
Request for Proposals for member states' and commercial enablers::
Revised Systems Contracts for 1B / Phase II
Construction of 1B camps start using member states' and commercial enablers
Global MST network and training set up under GSC
Construction of Phase II Service Packages start using member states' and commercial enablers
SDS inventory adjusted through rotation
Review of SDS composition for I C and II C phases
Maintenance and service contracts with member states' and commercial enablers start for phase 1 & II Service Packages
Revised Systems Contracts for 1C / Ii C

Notes:

1. The design, development and implementation of both phase I and II will continue through the remaining three years of the global field support strategy.
2. The construction of modularized service packages will be initiated by missions' enabling capabilities and existing resources, augmented by mission support teams and strategic deployment stocks.
3. Mission support teams will be developed into a global deployable enabler with uniform training, procedures and capacity.

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Agenda item 161
Financing of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan

Budget for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

I. Introduction

1. **The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommends approval of the proposals of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (A/66/532), subject to the observations and recommendations contained in the paragraphs below.**

2. During its consideration of the proposal, the Advisory Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification. The documents used by the Committee in its consideration of the financing of UNMISS are listed at the end of the present report.

II. Financial position and information on performance

3. In its resolution 65/257 B of 30 June 2011, the General Assembly noted the intention of the Security Council, as stated in its resolution 1978 (2011), to establish a successor mission to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and appropriated and assessed an amount of $482,460,550 for the maintenance of UNMIS for the six-month period from 1 July to 31 December 2011. The Assembly further authorized the Secretary-General to draw upon the resources approved for UNMIS in entering into commitments for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2011 for the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and any further missions established by the Security Council before 31 December 2011 in support of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

4. By its resolution 1996 (2011) of 8 July 2011, the Security Council established UNMISS for an initial period of one year, and decided that the Mission would

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consist of up to 7,000 military personnel, including military liaison officers and staff officers, up to 900 civilian police personnel, including, as appropriate, formed units, and an appropriate civilian component, including technical human rights investigation expertise.

5. Following the establishment of UNMISS and pursuant to authorization granted by the General Assembly in its resolution 65/257 B on the financing of UNMIS, commitment authority was provided for the deployment of UNMISS in the amount of $277,915,150 for the period ending 31 December 2011. Of the amount of $482,460,550 the General Assembly assessed upon Member States by its resolution 65/257 B, the amount of $277,915,150 was applied to the Special Account for UNMISS. The proposed budget for UNMISS for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 incorporates the commitment authority of $277,915,150.

6. Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with updated information on current expenditures under the commitment authority, which, as at 31 October 2011, amounted to $146,884,500 (see annex I).

III. Proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012

7. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/289, the Secretary-General's proposal for the start-up budget of UNMISS is formulated on the basis of the standardized funding model. The Advisory Committee's related report is contained in document A/65/743. The Committee notes that this is the first instance of the application of the standardized funding model. It comments on the standardized funding model and its applicability to UNMISS in paragraphs 26 to 36 and 65 to 73 below. For ease of reference, a summary of background information on and the main elements of the standardized funding model is contained in annex III to the present report.

A. Mandate and planned results

8. By its resolution 1996 (2011) of 8 July 2011, the Security Council mandated UNMISS, inter alia, to consolidate peace and security and to help establish the conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours.

B. Structure

9. As outlined in paragraphs 5 to 9 of the report of the Secretary-General (A/66/532), UNMISS, in seeking to implement its mandate, intends to function in an integrated manner that harnesses the different assets and capabilities of all parts of the United Nations system. The Secretary-General states that the Mission will work in a decentralized manner, with most staff being deployed at the state and county levels and key political and advisory functions being located at the Mission headquarters in Juba. Mission staff will be embedded in government structures at

the national, state and county levels in mandated areas to help expand State authority and build national capacities.

10. The Secretary-General indicates that the UNMISS headquarters in Juba will host the senior management team of the Mission, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Special Representative (Political), the Deputy Special Representative (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator), the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner. All senior managers will pay frequent visits to the state capitals and counties to ensure policy coherence and underline the decentralized approach of UNMISS throughout the country (ibid., para. 8).

11. Field offices will be established in each of the 10 states in South Sudan, namely Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, Warrap, Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria. Each of the offices will be led by a state coordinator, who will have a high degree of authority to manage day-to-day operations and coordinate the different functions of the Mission on the basis of joint workplans agreed by the Mission leadership (ibid., para. 9).

12. It is indicated in the Secretary-General's report that the staffing levels proposed for UNMISS are based on an expectation of what is realistically achievable within a three-year time frame. The staffing levels in the first year and the expected incremental increase in the following years are based on the circumstances on the ground, the level of government capacity and logistical realities (ibid., para 6). In his planning assumptions, the Secretary-General indicates that the Mission will take a phased approach to its staffing, reflecting likely developments during the first three years of its operation (ibid., paras. 12-14). In the first year, it is stated that the work of the Mission will be shaped by high levels of insecurity, high numbers of returnees, weak government structures and a political transition, including human rights challenges. The Secretary-General states that UNMISS will therefore need to quickly staff the areas of protection of civilians; the civil affairs network; political affairs; the Joint Mission Analysis Centre/Joint Operations Centre; recovery, reintegration and peacebuilding; human rights; public information; and United Nations police. It will also establish capacity in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and phase in capacity in the areas of the rule of law (including corrections and civil and military justice), as mandated by the Security Council, and security sector reform, if requested by the Government of South Sudan. During the first year, it is envisaged that the Mission will staff the 10 state offices and 19 of the envisaged 35 county support bases.

13. In the second year, when it is envisaged that there will a gradual consolidation of a new political dispensation, it is stated that the mission will need to maintain the staffing levels of the first year and increase staffing in the area of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. The Mission would also expand its presence at the county level, requiring additional staffing for nine new county support bases, bringing the total to 28, as well as the increased presence of the United Nations police.

14. During the third year of operation of the Mission, it is assumed that elections will be held or that preparations for them will be under way. During this phase, UNMISS will request electoral staffing and will also continue to expand its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and United Nations police staffing,

with police levels reaching 900 within the three-year period. In addition, eight additional county support bases will be set up, bringing the total to 35. It is, however, stated that if certain conditions are met, the staffing for rule of law and security sector reform may be reduced.

15. As noted in paragraph 9 above, UNMISS will operate in a decentralized manner. The Mission's field presence in each state, including the state and county support bases, will be overseen by a state coordinator at the D-1 or P-5 level, who will be responsible for overseeing mandate implementation at the state and county level. In order to avoid duplication and to maximize coherence, multifunctional thematic groups, referred to in the report as clusters, would be established at the state level. These would include the political cluster, comprised of the State Coordinator's Office, civil affairs and security sector reform; the reintegration cluster, comprised of reintegration, recovery and peacebuilding, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; and the protective environment cluster, comprised of human rights, justice, women's protection and child protection. The Advisory Committee was also informed that there would also be a decentralized approach to the management of the Mission support component, with offices serving as hubs, using mobile staff to provide support to multiple states and counties.

16. **The Advisory Committee notes the proposals for the establishment of multifunctional clusters, which should facilitate a coherent approach to mandate delivery. The Committee also notes the decentralized approach taken in the organizational structure of the Mission and expects that the Secretary-General will document, disseminate and apply lessons learned, as well as draw from experience in deploying such complex, decentralized missions as UNMIS and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).**

17. The Secretary-General states that the Mission will conduct its operations with a view to maximizing its positive economic and social impact and mitigating its environmental impact on South Sudan. It is stated that, wherever practical, the Mission will seek to procure goods locally, hire local people and build their skills, and design its infrastructure and operations with a view to the legacy it will leave. In addition, the Mission intends to implement quick-impact projects at the county level and in neighbouring communities, delivering development dividends to improve local conditions and build confidence for the Mission in general (ibid., para. 16).

18. The Committee recalls that the Secretary-General, in his proposed budget for the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 for UNMIS, intended to focus on reducing the environmental impact of the Mission through continued acquisition and installation of waste thermal biological incinerators with energy recovery and clean air technology (A/65/731, para. 26). **The Advisory Committee recalls its previous recommendations on initiatives to mitigate the environmental impact of peacekeeping missions, and expects the Secretary-General to carry forward the initiatives commenced under the umbrella of UNMIS and to share lessons from the outcome of these initiatives with other peacekeeping operations.**

19. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that UNMISS had taken into account the need for capacity-building in South Sudan from the outset. The Committee was informed that the Mission intends to encourage the creation of small businesses and cooperatives in South Sudan that may eventually be used to provide services to the Mission on a contractual basis. UNMISS is giving consideration to

the development of relevant skill sets among its national staff and is identifying proposed international posts that may eventually be proposed for conversion into national posts. **The Advisory Committee welcomes the stated focus of UNMISS on national capacity-building and looks forward to receiving further information on progress made in this area in future reports.**

C. Regional mission cooperation

Regional Service Centre

20. With regard to the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe, Uganda, the Secretary-General states that in accordance with resolution 64/269, the results-based-budgeting frameworks for the Regional Service Centre, as well as the UNMISS share for the post and non-post resource requirements of the Centre for 2011/12 are reflected in the budget proposal. It is stated that a total of 14 posts (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 6 Field Service and 5 national General Service) are assigned to the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe. The UNMISS share of the costs for the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe is stated as being $2,582,700 for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (see A/66/532, para. 19).

21. The Advisory Committee recalls that it had highlighted the importance of scalability with regard to the regional service centres, with the drawdown of a mission having an impact on the volume of activity and resources available to the centres (A/64/660, para. 118). The Committee notes that it is proposed that the 14 UNMIS posts that were relocated to the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe be maintained as UNMISS posts. However, the Committee notes that, with a total authorized personnel of 11,534, UNMISS is significantly smaller than UNMIS, which comprised 15,415 personnel during the financial period 2010/11.

22. **The Advisory Committee reiterates the recommendation contained in its report on the proposed budget of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) that the Secretary-General should henceforth include a separate section on the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe in the budgets of all missions that it serves, providing details on the number of staff assigned to the Centre and the nature and scope of services provided and highlighting any efficiency gains anticipated to be derived by each client mission (see A/66/576, para. 16). The Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will apply a coherent methodology to determine the distribution of the requirements for human and financial resources for the Regional Service Centre among its client missions, commensurate with the overall level of support required from the Centre. Bearing in mind paragraph 91 of General Assembly resolution 65/289, the Advisory Committee intends to revert to this issue in the context of its review of the annual report on the Regional Service Centre.**

D. Cooperation with other United Nations entities

23. The Advisory Committee was informed that UNMISS would work closely with the United Nations country team to coordinate the delivery of mandates over the lifespan of the Mission and to use the Mission as a platform to facilitate the activities of United Nations offices, funds and programmes. The Committee was also informed that UNMISS would work with non-governmental organizations in

the Mission area. The Secretary-General indicates that the United Nations country team is currently implementing a range of programmes in South Sudan in areas such as service delivery, agricultural extension and food security, the rule of law, governance, community security and conflict mitigation, among others. It is further stated that during the next three years the United Nations country team will be increasing programme presence in accordance with its United Nations Development Assistance Framework in a number of key areas, including governance, service delivery, agricultural-led growth, social programmes, reintegration, rural development, the rule of law and conflict mitigation (see A/66/532, para. 20).

24. The Advisory Committee was informed that there was a substantive intersection between the Mission's mandate and the work of the United Nations country team, including in such key areas as civil affairs, the rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, mine action, gender and child protection. It was stated that joint workplans will be developed by the United Nations country team and the Mission in order to avoid overlap of activities and ensure strong complementarities. The Committee was further informed that the Mission will work to ensure that the division of labour is clear and in line with the comparative advantage of each member of the United Nations country team.

25. The Secretary-General states in his report that UNMISS will be required to engage fully in its mandated areas, at least during the first two years, and to help lay the groundwork for the building of large programmes to be implemented by the United Nations country team and bilateral and multilateral partners. As programmes implemented by partners are established, UNMISS will need to determine whether responsibilities for some key areas and support can be incrementally handed over to the United Nations country team (ibid., paras. 21 and 22). **The Advisory Committee trusts that UNMISS will maintain coordination and cooperation within the United Nations country team in the context of an efficient division of labour.**

E. Standardized funding model

26. As indicated in paragraph 7 above, the budget for UNMISS for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 is the first instance in which the Secretary-General has submitted a mission budget formulated on the basis of the standardized funding model. In order to facilitate consideration of the Secretary-General's proposals, the Advisory Committee provides a summary of the main elements of the standardized funding model in annex III to the present report.

27. The Secretary-General sets out his planning assumptions and provides some details on the activities envisaged for the first, second and third years of the Mission's operations (ibid., paras. 12-14). In line with the standardized funding model (see A/65/743, para. 203), the budget document provides:

(a) Mandate-specific results-based budgeting frameworks for the substantive components of the mission;

(b) An indicative results-based-budgeting framework for the support component of the mission, based on the scenario and profile that most closely resemble the new mandate;

(c) A detailed mission-specific staffing table based on the mandate of the mission;

(d) Financial resources based on the scenario and profile that most closely resemble the new mandate.

28. The Advisory Committee was informed that the Secretary-General had decided not to apply the standardized funding model to the budget of UNISFA, which was established almost concurrently with UNMISS, because UNISFA was not large enough in terms of number of uniformed personnel to constitute a suitable fit under the Mission profiles defined for the standardized funding model.

29. The Secretary-General indicated in his report on the global field support strategy that the standardized funding model is intended to reflect a more homogeneous approach to operational support requirements, in particular in the early stages of a mission, when the deployment of resources is limited by what can be achieved initially (see A/64/633, para. 49). The Secretary-General indicated that the standardized funding model was built upon the operational similarity of missions in the first year of operations: while mandates differed, initial resource requirements in the first year of operations were largely similar across missions, with resource specificities arising from differences in mandates generally becoming evident in the second year of operations. The Committee was informed that the UNMISS budget provided an indicative level of resources, calculated on the basis of actual, historic deployment experience. It was further informed that, given the dynamic operational environment that characterizes the start-up phase of a mission, a core assumption of the Secretary-General is that the standardized funding model must be viewed as an integrated package and that attention must be paid to ensuring that the overall level of funding is reasonable. However, the model would allow some flexibility to accommodate mission-specific conditions. For this reason it did not include a standard results-based-budgeting framework or detailed staffing table, which would be developed for every start-up situation (see A/65/696, para. 43).

30. The key elements used to categorize field missions under the standardized funding model approach included: (a) standard scenarios reflecting the level of logistical challenges posed and the size of the mission area; and (b) standard profiles, characterizing the level of authorized uniformed personnel, with profiles 1, 2 and 3 corresponding to authorized levels of 5,000, 10,000 and 15,000 military and police personnel, respectively (ibid., paras. 52-59). The model proposed a standard funding level for each of the resulting six scenario/profile combinations, which was derived using data on overall expenditure levels of actual start-up missions during their first year of operation, at 2011/12 rates.

31. The Advisory Committee notes that the standardized funding model seeks to provide an appropriate level of funding resources for the first year of operations and therefore, with the exception of information on staffing proposals, the proposed UNMISS budget does not provide detailed justifications under other areas, such as operational costs. Accordingly, in considering the Secretary-General's proposals for the start-up budget of UNMISS, the Advisory Committee has focused its recommendations on the proposed mission-specific staffing requirements and the overall level of funding proposed.

32. The Advisory Committee was informed that the mission profile with 10,000 uniformed personnel, under scenario II, was selected as the closest fit to the

circumstances of UNMISS, based on the average deployment projected throughout the budget period and on the size and level of the logistical challenges of the Mission area. The Advisory Committee notes that the profiles and scenarios used for the development of the standardized funding model in document A/65/696 were based on the experience of the Organization in deploying missions that did not have extensive assets and infrastructure remaining in place in the mission area from previous and liquidating United Nations peacekeeping presences. The circumstances pertaining to UNMISS are therefore different from a typical mission start-up, particularly in that it will benefit from the transfer of resources from UNMIS, including personnel, logistical resources and infrastructure. As indicated in paragraph 218 of the Secretary-General's report, of the total UNMIS mandated force strength of 7,900 uniformed personnel, 5,581 uniformed personnel, comprising 196 military observers, 5,007 military contingent personnel and 378 United Nations police, were redeployed to UNMISS. In this regard, the Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that it was planned that 733 former UNMIS international staff would transfer to UNMISS and that assets with a total value of $129.9 million would be received from UNMIS.

33. **Given the transfer of uniformed and civilian personnel and assets from UNMIS, the Advisory Committee is of the view that the logistical challenges that UNMISS faces differ from those that would generally apply to a new or expanding mission as envisaged under the mission profiles and scenarios contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the standardized funding model (A/65/696). The Committee does not, therefore, consider UNMISS to be an adequate case to use to reliably assess the effectiveness of the standardized funding model approach to budget formulation (see paras. 71-73 below).**

34. The Advisory Committee further notes that the total number of 7,900 authorized uniformed personnel in UNMISS, comprising 166 military observers, 6,834 military contingent personnel and 900 police, is significantly less than the number of 10,000 authorized uniformed personnel envisaged in the corresponding mission profile in the standardized funding model, while the civilian component of 3,053 is considerably higher than the corresponding mission profile civilian component of 2,697 (see para. 42 below). The Committee also notes that, while the standardized funding model is based on the requirements for the first 12 months of a new or expanding mission, UNMISS was established from 9 July 2011; however, the amount of the proposed budget was not adjusted to reflect requirements for the balance of the financial period of the first year of operation of the Mission, as was envisaged under the proposals for the standardized funding model (see A/65/696, para. 38).

35. In paragraph 205 of its report on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations (A/65/743), the Advisory Committee had emphasized that the formulation of budget proposals based on a standardized funding model should not in any way lessen the requirement for the full justification of the resources proposed. It had also emphasized that the performance reports should provide comprehensive explanations on the resources utilized as well as details on actual achievements, in accordance with established budgetary procedure. The Committee's views were endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 65/289. **The Advisory Committee will pay particular attention to the level and utilization of human and financial resources provided in the first year of the Mission in the context of its review of the budget for the period from 1 July**

2012 to 30 June 2013 and the performance report for UNMISS for the period 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (see para. 68 below).

36. The Advisory Committee also recalls its stated expectation that a review of the utilization of the standardized funding model should seek to update and adjust the funding levels, as well as to review assumptions, and to assess the adequacy of the model itself, in particular the civilian staffing model, and its recommendation that the review be conducted following issuance of the performance report for the first start-up mission to which the standardized funding model is applied, or after a three-year period, if, at that time, no such review has taken place (A/65/743, para. 209). **The Advisory Committee trusts that lessons learned from the application of the standardized funding model in UNMISS will be provided in the context of the performance report. After considering that review, the Committee will provide its views on the effectiveness of the standardized funding model as applied in UNMISS, as well as its recommendations with respect to its subsequent application. Pending submission of the performance report, the Committee has provided preliminary remarks on the standardized funding model in paragraphs 69 to 73 below.**

F. Resource requirements

37. The proposed budget of UNMISS for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 amounts to $738,266,500 gross ($727,946,500 net) and provides for the deployment of 166 military observers, 6,834 military contingent personnel, 900 United Nations police officers, 957 international staff, 1,590 national staff, 506 United Nations Volunteers and 81 Government-provided personnel, as well as for 500 temporary positions. As noted in paragraph 7 above, the standardized funding model has been used as the basis for the UNMISS start-up budget.

38. The Advisory Committee was provided with additional information on the actual and planned deployment of UNMISS mission personnel in the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (see annex II).

Military and police personnel

Category	*Proposed 2011/12*[a]
Military observers	166
Military contingent personnel	6 834
United Nations police	900
Total	**7 900**

[a] Represents the highest authorized strength for the period.

39. The requested budgetary resources amounting to $247,009,100 for military and police personnel would provide for the deployment of 166 military observers, 6,834 military contingent personnel and 900 United Nations police.

40. The Advisory Committee was informed that the mission profile of 10,000 uniformed personnel under the standardized funding model was selected for the formulation of the UNMISS budget on the basis of the average deployment of

uniformed personnel projected in the first year of the Mission. The Committee had previously been informed that the profile consisting of 10,000 authorized uniformed personnel under the standardized funding model is based on an average of 6,774 uniformed personnel deployed in the first year (see A/65/743, table 11). The Committee notes that a total of 5,763 uniformed personnel, comprising military observers and contingent and police personnel, were deployed in UNMISS by the end of July 2011 and that the projected average deployment of uniformed personnel for UNMISS would in fact amount to 6,371 military observers, and contingent and police personnel for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (see annex II), a variance of less than 1 per cent from the average deployment under the corresponding standardized funding model mission profile.

Civilian personnel

Category	*Proposed 2011/12*
International staff	957
National staff[a]	1 590
United Nations Volunteers	506
Temporary positions	500
Total	**3 553**

[a] Including both National Officers and national General Service personnel.

41. The total civilian staffing component of 3,553 proposed for UNMISS includes a total of 957 international staff, 1,590 national staff posts, 506 United Nations Volunteers and 500 temporary positions, as shown in the table above. The budgetary requirement of $91,674,300 for civilian personnel in UNMISS is based on the relevant profile and scenario under the standardized funding model.

42. The Advisory Committee notes that the proposed total of 3,553 civilian personnel for UNMISS, inclusive of temporary positions, is significantly higher than the total of 2,697 civilian personnel under the relevant mission profile and scenario using the standardized funding model, which comprises 719 international staff, 1,734 national staff and 244 United Nations Volunteers (see A/65/743, table 8). The Committee recalls that the scenario used from the standardized funding model was based on an average deployment in the first year of 1,097 civilian personnel, comprising 331 international staff, 642 national staff and 124 United Nations Volunteers (see A/65/743, table 10).

43. The Committee notes that the projected average deployment of civilian personnel for UNMISS in the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 will in fact amount to 2,578 such personnel, comprising 746 international staff, 1,558 national staff and 274 United Nations Volunteers (see annex II), which is significantly higher than the levels in the relevant profile under the standardized funding model.

44. Given this higher deployment rate, the Advisory Committee notes that UNMISS may require more resources to cover civilian personnel costs in the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 than provided under the relevant scenario of the standardized funding model. The Committee also notes that the standardized funding model upon which the UNMISS proposed budget is based provides an

overall envelope of funding and that UNMISS may need to redeploy resources to meet its actual requirements for civilian personnel. In this regard, UNMISS may benefit from lower requirements under operational costs due to the assets and infrastructure transferred from UNMIS. **Accordingly, the Advisory Committee expects that expenditure patterns under civilian personnel and other categories of expenditure will be closely monitored during the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012.**

Executive direction and management

Location	*Proposed staffing*	*Level*
Juba	85	1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 3 D-1, 7 P-5, 12 P-4, 13 P-3, 1 P-2, 14 Field Service, 11 National Professional Officer, 12 local level, 8 United Nations Volunteers
Total	**85**	

45. The staffing resources proposed under executive direction and management are described in paragraphs 24 to 42 of the report of the Secretary-General (A/66/532). A total of 85 posts and United Nations Volunteer positions is proposed for 10 staff for the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 7 staff for the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political), 9 staff for the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Humanitarian), 5 staff for Special Advisers, 14 staff for the Office of the Chief of Staff, 4 staff for the Best Practices Unit, 5 staff for the Office of Field Support, 5 staff for the Strategic Planning Unit, 14 staff for the Legal Affairs Unit and 12 staff for the Conduct and Discipline Unit.

46. **The Advisory Committee considers that the number of staff requested under executive direction and management may be excessive and, therefore, makes specific comments and recommendations on posts in the paragraphs below.**

47. The Advisory Committee notes that the Office of the Chief of Staff is proposed to consist of 14 civilian personnel and that the Chief of Staff will provide support to the Special Representative in the management of day-to-day responsibilities and is responsible for ensuring integrated and coherent functioning across all areas and components of the Mission. The Chief of Staff will also ensure the functioning of core integrated mechanisms for planning, analysis and operations and will oversee internal management of the Mission (A/66/532, para. 29). In addition to the Chief of Staff, the proposed staffing includes a Deputy Chief of Staff at the P-5 level.

48. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that a key role of the Chief of Staff was to oversee the Field Support Office which would manage the 10 state offices and to which the 10 State Coordinators would report. Given this requirement, in addition to that of the strategic coordination of the various components of the mission, the Deputy Chief of Staff would provide support through having a lead role in the internal management of the Office of the Chief of Staff. **The Advisory Committee is not convinced of the need for the post of Deputy Chief of Staff. Pending the receipt of full justification for the post in the context of the proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013,**

the Committee recommends that a temporary position of Senior Officer at the P-5 level be approved for the Office of the Chief of Staff, under general temporary assistance.

49. In paragraph 30 of the report of the Secretary-General, under the Office of the Chief of Staff, three National Professional Officers are proposed as Protocol/Liaison Officers to handle arrangements for the travel of the Special Representative and other senior managers. The Advisory Committee was informed that the Protocol/Liaison Officers are required to meet the workload in the area of travel and that the incumbents will also provide training for other United Nations personnel on issues of protocol, as well as assisting in training Government personnel. **The Advisory Committee does not find sufficient justification for the three proposed National Professional Officer posts for Protocol/Liaison Officers. Pending further justification in the context of the proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, the Committee recommends the approval of two temporary National Professional Officer positions, instead of the three National Professional Officer posts proposed.**

50. Four posts (one P-5, one P-4, one P-3 and one National Officer) and one United Nations Volunteer position are proposed for the Strategic Planning Unit to coordinate the production, monitoring and adjustment of planning tools that translate the Security Council mandate and the vision of the Special Representative into the allocation of tasks and resources (ibid., para. 32). Two Planning Officers (one National Officer and one international United Nations Volunteer) are also proposed to assist in training mission staff in the use of relevant planning tools and provide support to substantive units as requested. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that the training functions under the Strategic Planning Unit can be delivered in coordination with the proposed Training Section. It therefore recommends approval of one P-5, one P-4 and one P-3 post as well as one United Nations Volunteer position, but recommends against approval of the National Professional Officer post proposed for this Unit.**

51. With regard to the Best Practices Unit, four posts (one P-4, two P-3 and one National Professional Officer) are requested, consisting of one Best Practices Officer (P-4) to lead the Unit, one Best Practices Officer (P-3) to be responsible for the civilian component, one Best Practices Officer (P-3) who would cover the military component and one Best Practices Officer at the National Professional Officer level. In addition, one Officer (P-3) would be assigned to the Office of the Director of Mission Support with the assignment of supporting the Mission's efforts to maximize local procurement and the positive economic impact of the Mission (ibid., para. 34). **The Advisory Committee recognizes the importance of using lessons learned and the implementation of best practices in peacekeeping missions. However, the Committee is of the view that the necessary support can be provided by a staffing of one P-4, one P-3 and one National Professional Best Practices Officers. It therefore recommends against approval of one of the P-3 posts.**

Component 1: peace consolidation and extension of state authority

Location	*Proposed staffing*	*Level*
Juba	103	3 D-1, 6 P-5, 8 P-4, 11 P-3, 2 P-2, 11 Field Service, 8 National Professional Officers, 46 Local level, 8 United Nations Volunteers
State and county offices	113	3 P-5, 6 P-4, 17 P-3, 21 National Professional Officers, 38 Local level, 28 United Nations Volunteers
Total	**216**	

52. The requested resources under component 1, Peace consolidation and extension of State authority, are described in paragraphs 44 to 65 of the report of the Secretary-General. Under this component, a total of 216 staff, including 36 United Nations Volunteers, are proposed: 18 staff in the Political Affairs Division; 109 staff in the Communication and Public Information Division; and 89 staff in the Recovery, Reintegration and Peacebuilding Section.

53. The Advisory Committee notes that out of the total of 109 posts and United Nations Volunteer positions proposed for the Communication and Public Information Division of UNMISS, 71 will be at the Mission headquarters and 38 in the field offices. The Committee also notes from the results-based-budgeting framework that one output refers to the formulation of a five-year plan for the transition of Radio Miraya to an independent broadcaster, including a financially sustainable transmission network and training plan to strengthen the capacity of national staff in the areas of management and editorial leadership.

54. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the Mission continues to operate Radio Miraya, the radio station which had been operated by UNMIS, although the staffing of the Division has been reduced from previous levels, commensurate with the mandate of UNMISS. The Committee was informed that plans were under way to transition the radio station to South Sudanese ownership. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will take into consideration all relevant factors in carrying out the transition of Radio Miraya within the envisaged time frame. The Committee requests that information on progress in that regard be included in future reports of the Secretary-General.**

Component 2: conflict mitigation and protection of civilians

Location	*Proposed staffing*	*Level*
Juba	43	2 D-2, 1 D-1, 3 P-5, 3 P-4, 10 P-3, 6 P-2, 4 Field Service, 4 National Professional Officer, 3 Local level, 7 United Nations Volunteers
State and county offices	198	3 D-1, 10 P-5, 10 P-4, 23 P-3, 10 Field Service, 35 National Professional Officer, 19 Local level, 88 United Nations Volunteers
Total	**241**	

55. The requested resources for component 2, conflict mitigation and protection of civilians, are described in paragraphs 66 to 82 of the Secretary-General's report. A total of 241 posts and United Nations Volunteer positions are proposed, including 69 posts and United Nations Volunteer positions for the State Coordinator's Office, 14 staff for the Joint Operations Centre, 12 staff for the Joint Mission Analysis Centre, 140 for the Civil Affairs Division and 6 for the Office of the Force Commander.

Component 3: capacity-building

Location	*Proposed staffing*	*Level*
Juba	110	1 D-2, 3 D-1, 13 P-5, 19 P-4, 16 P-3, 4 P-2, 13 Field Service, 12 National Professional Officer, 11 Local level, 18 United Nations Volunteers
State and county offices	124	1 P-5, 16 P-4, 29 P-3, 7 P-2, 2 Field Service, 22 National Professional Officer, 26 Local level, 21 United Nations Volunteers
Total	**234**	

56. The requested resources for component 3, capacity-building, are described in paragraphs 83 to 115 of the report of the Secretary-General. A total of 234 posts and United Nations Volunteer positions are proposed under this component for 99 staff for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section, 29 staff for the Office of the Police Commissioner, 10 staff for the Rule of Law and Security Institutions Support Office, 37 staff for the Judicial Advisory Section, 3 posts for the Military Justice and Advisory Section, 21 staff for the Corrections Advisory Section, 24 staff for the Security Sector Reform Unit and 11 staff for the HIV/AIDS Unit.

Component 4: human rights

Location	*Proposed staffing*	*Level*
Juba	38	1 D-2, 5 P-5, 9 P-4, 8 P-3, 1 P-2, 4 Field Service, 5 National Professional Officer, 4 Local level, 1 United Nations Volunteers
State and county offices	113	10 P-4, 23 P-3, 23 National Professional Officer, 22 Local level, 35 United Nations Volunteers
Total	**151**	

57. The requested resources for component 4, human rights, are described in paragraphs 116 to 134 of the Secretary-General's report. A total of 151 posts and United Nations Volunteer positions are proposed for this component, including 98 staff for the Human Rights Division; 27 staff for the Child Protection Unit; 10 staff for the Women's Protection Unit; and 16 staff for the Gender Affairs Unit.

Component 5: support

Location	*Proposed staffing*	*Level*
Juba	760	1 D-2, 3 D-1, 17 P-5, 34 P-4, 46 P-3, 13 P-2, 182 Field Service, 25 National Professional Officer, 368 Local level, 71 United Nations Volunteers
State and county offices	1 726	8 P-4, 40 P-3, 16 P-2, 220 Field Service, 24 National Professional Officer, 1,200 Local level, 218 United Nations Volunteers
Entebbe (non-Regional Service Centre)	112	1 P-5, 8 P-4, 4 P-3, 2 P-2, 40 Field Service, 9 National Professional Officer, 45 Local level, 3 United Nations Volunteers
Mombasa	14	1 P-3, 3 Field Service, 2 National Professional Officer, 8 Local level
Total	**2 612**	

58. The requested resources for component 5, support, are described in paragraphs 135 to 210 of the Secretary-General's report. A total of 2,612 posts and United Nations Volunteer positions are proposed under mission support for 89 staff for the Office of the Director of Mission Support, 467 staff for Administrative Services, 1,394 staff for Integrated Support Services and 662 staff for the Safety and Security Section, excluding the posts proposed to be integrated into the Regional Service Centre. Overall mission support is to be provided by the Office of the Director of Mission Support, headed by a Director of Mission Support (D-2) based at the Mission's headquarters in Juba and proposed to comprise 30 staff in Juba and 59 staff in field offices. The Office of the Director of Mission Support will include the Support Planning and Policy Unit, the Budget Unit, the Aviation and Safety Unit and the Board of Inquiry Unit. Administrative and technical support will be provided at the state and county levels under the coordination of the Deputy Director of Mission Support (D-1). UNMISS Administrative Services includes the United Nations Volunteer Support Unit, the Staff Counselling and Welfare Unit, and the Finance, Human Resources, Procurement, Contracts Management, Medical Services, General Services and Training Sections. A total of 189 staff are proposed for Administrative Services at the Mission headquarters, 103 in the UNMISS offices in Entebbe and 175 in the field offices. Integrated Support Services comprises the Office of the Chief, the Joint Logistics Operations Centre and the Movement Control, Communications and Information Technology, Property Management, Geographic Information Systems, Transport, Aviation, Supply and Engineering Sections. According to the Secretary-General, the staff of the Integrated Support Services will provide support to UNMISS at the state and county levels, as well as in Entebbe, Uganda, and in Mombasa, Kenya.

59. The Advisory Committee notes that the proposed budget for UNMISS includes a total of 112 staff to be located in Entebbe to provide services directly to the Mission, comprising 103 staff under Administrative Services and 9 under Integrated Support Services. The UNMISS staffing proposed in Entebbe consists of 48 posts and 3 United Nations Volunteers positions in the Human Resources Section, 40 in the Finance Section, 8 staff in the Procurement Section, 3 posts in the Communication and Information Technology Section, 3 posts in the Medical

Services Section, 1 post in the Geographic Information Systems Section, 5 posts in the Supply Section and 1 post in the Regional Training Centre.

60. The requested human resources to be integrated into the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe are described in paragraphs 211 and 212 of the Secretary-General's report and will occupy 14 posts. The comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the support provided to UNMISS by the Regional Service Centre are contained in paragraphs 20 to 22 above.

Regional Service Centre

Location	*Proposed staffing*	*Level*
Entebbe	14	1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 6 Field Service, 5 Local level
Total	**14**	

61. **Subject to the recommendations contained in paragraphs 48, 49, 50 and 51 above, the Advisory Committee recommends approval of the Secretary-General's proposals for civilian personnel for UNMISS.**

Operational costs

62. The UNMISS budget includes requirements of $399,583,100 for operational costs in the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012, based on the relevant profile and scenario under the standardized funding model as discussed in preceding paragraphs of the present report.

63. The Advisory Committee was informed that the priority construction projects in the first year of the Mission are the Mission headquarters in Juba, including hardwall staff accommodation; the enlargement of nine state capital facilities; the construction or enlargement of 19 county support bases; the reconfiguration of 11 existing military bases and the construction of eight new military bases; the enlargement of the Juba logistics base and the establishment of two main hubs and two secondary hubs; the maintenance of roads and the extension of three landing strips; and the construction of three disarmament, demobilization and reintegration transitional centres. **The Advisory Committee is concerned as to whether UNMISS will have adequate capacity to oversee the ambitious construction programme planned for the critical start-up phase. It also notes other logistical difficulties which could impede construction work during certain periods of the year. The Advisory Committee expects the Secretary-General to monitor progress and ensure that the construction is completed according to schedule.**

64. The Advisory Committee was informed that among the significant drivers of operational costs is the elevated requirement for air transportation in the first year of the Mission, which will be reduced starting in the second year of the Mission owing to the increased use of fixed-wing aircraft as compared to rotary-wing aircraft.

IV. Comments and observations

65. The Secretary-General's comments in paragraphs 213 to 220 of his report, as well as the observations in paragraphs 26 to 36 above, clearly demonstrate the difficulties encountered in applying the standardized funding model to the start-up of UNMISS and formulating the budget proposals for the Mission's first year of operation. UNMISS, as a successor mission to UNMIS, is not "typical" of a start-up mission. **The Advisory Committee notes that the key premise on which the standardized funding model is based, namely, the similarity of the operations and resource requirements of missions in their first year of existence as they build up the deployment of personnel and assets, does not fully apply in the case of UNMISS, given its inheritance of personnel and assets from UNMIS.**

66. **The Advisory Committee also experienced certain difficulties in its consideration of the budgetary proposals for UNMISS for the 2011/12 period, in particular the lack of clarity and transparency as to the real requirements of the Mission. On the one hand, there is specific information available as to the number and type of personnel and the assets currently deployed in the Mission (see para. 32. above), including those that are to be transferred from UNMIS, and consequently on the resource requirements for 2011/12. On the other hand, the budgetary proposals are based on the assumptions underlying the standardized funding model in terms of the deployment of personnel and assets, which differ from the reality on the ground. In the Committee's view, given the particular circumstances of UNMISS, the application of the standardized funding model for the first year of operations of UNMISS appears to have created an artificial constraint impeding the full presentation of the current and known requirements of the Mission for the 2011/12 period, rather than providing the greater flexibility sought by the Mission's leadership team to translate the total funding envelope into mission-specific programmatic and support requirements (A/66/532, para. 214).**

67. **Furthermore, by its very nature, the standardized funding model was intended to accelerate the preparation of the necessary budgetary documentation, including the organizational structure, and, hence, the obtainment of funding in the start-up phase of a mission. In the case of UNMISS, following its establishment on 8 July 2011, an amount of $277,915,150 was provided for the deployment of the Mission for the period ending 31 December 2011, pursuant to the authorization granted by the General Assembly in its resolution 65/257 B on the financing of UNMIS (see para. 3 above). The Mission therefore did not face the time constraints of a typical start-up mission and had sufficient time to prepare a full budget for consideration by the General Assembly.**

68. **While the Advisory Committee considers that the start-up budget submission for UNMISS should not have been based on the standardized funding model, were it to request a full budget proposal for the 2011/12 period, such a proposal could be submitted, at the earliest, for consideration by the General Assembly at its resumed sixty-sixth session. Given the timing of the budget cycle, preparation of the budgetary proposals for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 is already under way. Under the circumstances, the Committee considers that approval of the start-up budget as presented in document A/66/532 would be the most practical approach. The Committee**

recommends that the Secretary-General should be requested to provide a comprehensive explanation of the resources utilized as well as details on actual achievements in the context of the performance report for UNMISS for the 2011/12 period. As indicated in paragraph 35 above, the Committee will also pay particular attention to the level and utilization of human and financial resources provided in the first year of the Mission in the context of its review of the budget for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013. In this connection, the Advisory Committee notes the Secretary-General's intention of making every effort to remain within the limits of the funding provided through the standardized funding model (ibid., para. 220). In this regard, the Committee was also informed that a resource management committee had been established by UNMISS to ensure accountability and the appropriate alignment of resources and priorities.

69. With respect to the question of the applicability of the standardized funding model to the requirements of start-up peacekeeping operations, while recognizing that it may be premature to conduct a full review (see A/65/743, para. 209), the Advisory Committee believes that a number of lessons can be learned from the experience acquired thus far in the context of the first application of the model.

70. Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/289, by which the Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to apply the standardized funding model, two new peacekeeping operations have been established by the Security Council, namely, UNISFA and UNMISS. The Secretary-General stated that the model was not applicable to UNISFA and acknowledged the difficulties in using the model to formulate the budgetary proposals for UNMISS. **While noting the particular circumstances of these two missions, the Committee considers that every new peacekeeping operation will be unique and present its own specificities. The modalities of any standardized funding model should therefore be sufficiently flexible to accommodate a wide range of operational requirements and conditions. The current design of the model, limited to six profile/scenario combinations with an overall level of funding for each combination, may be too restrictive and therefore limit the application of the model to a narrow range of "typical" start-up operations. The Committee is of the view that alternative methodologies for establishing standardized funding and costing models should also be explored, based, inter alia, on the experience acquired through the first application of the model, to UNMISS. In its previous report, the Committee encouraged the Secretary-General to further refine the costing model and the analysis of the costs related to specific activities and outputs. The Committee continues to emphasize the importance of making available transparent information on standard unit costs for services and outputs.**

71. **The Advisory Committee also questions whether the standardized funding model, as applied to UNMISS, meets the key objective of the Secretary-General, which was to accelerate the process for obtaining the necessary funding for start-up operations. It notes that the budget document remains voluminous and does not appear to be designed to accelerate either its production by the Secretariat or its consideration by the General Assembly. In this regard, the Secretary-General should also assess the impact of the increased authorities granted to him by the General Assembly in its resolution**

64/269,[1] which, taken together, allow him rapid access to up to $150 million for each start-up or expansion of a peacekeeping operation.

72. **The Advisory Committee invites the Secretary-General to analyse the lessons learned from the first application of the standardized funding model, with a view to determining the extent to which it meets the expectations of both of the Secretariat and the Member States, taking into account the observations in the paragraphs above. He should assess the viability of the model and propose any further refinements, as relevant.**

73. **The Committee emphasizes the importance of maintaining and improving transparency in the budget process. It believes that the translation of mandates into effective budgetary proposals is an important process that should provide Member States with clear information on the activities to be accomplished during the corresponding financial period and a better understanding of the resources to be engaged in that effort.**

V. Conclusion

74. In section III.F above, the Advisory Committee has made a number of observations and recommendations on the Secretary-General's proposals for the staffing of the Mission and other resource requirements (see paras. 48-51 above). The Committee recognizes that its recommendations on specific positions or operational costs will not result in a reduction in the level of the proposed resources, given that the standardized funding model provides an indicative level of overall funding (see para. 29 above). **Nevertheless, subject to their approval by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General should take the aforementioned recommendations into account during the start-up period, as well as in the preparation of the budgetary proposals for UNMISS for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013.**

75. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of the Mission are set out in paragraph 223 of the Secretary-General's report. **Taking into account its recommendation in paragraph 68 above, the Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly:**

(a) **Establish a Special Account for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan for the purpose of accounting for the income received and expenditure incurred in respect of the Mission;**

(b) **Appropriate the amount of $738,266,500 for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012;**

(c) **Apply to the Special Account for UNMISS the total amount of $277,915,150 from the amount of $482,460,550 previously assessed under the**

[1] (a) To enter into commitments of up to $100 million from the available balance of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, subject to the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
(b) To enter into commitments of up to $50 million of the available balance of the stores available from the Organization's strategic deployment stocks, with the drawings from the stocks to be replenished when the initial budget appropriation is received.

terms of its resolution 65/257 B for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and UNMISS;

(d) **Taking into account the amount of $277,915,150 applied to the Special Account for UNMISS referred to in subparagraph (c) above, assess the amount of $460,351,350 for the period from 9 July 2011 to 30 June 2012.**

Documentation

- Budget for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (A/66/532)
- Budget for the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 (A/66/526)
- Report of the Secretary-General on a standardized funding model of the global field support strategy (A/65/696 and Corr.1)
- Security Council resolution 1978 (2011) of 27 April 2011
- Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) of 8 July 2011
- Observations and recommendations on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations: Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/65/743)
- Report of the Secretary-General on the global field support strategy (A/64/633)
- Observations and recommendations on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations; Global field support strategy: Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/64/660)

Annex I

UNMISS
Expenditure from 1 July 2011 to 31 October 2011

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Commitment authority from 1 July to 31 December 2011	*Expenditures from 1 July to 31 October 2011*	*Unencumbered balance*
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)=(1)-(2)*
Military and police personnel			
Military observers	2 973.6	165.2	2 808.4
Military contingents	73 033.2	39 263.7	33 769.5
United Nations police	13 116.4	4 302.7	8 813.7
Formed police	—	—	—
Subtotal	**89 123.2**	**43 731.6**	**45 391.5**
Civilian personnel			
International staff	661.0	—	661.0
National staff	42.8	—	42.8
United Nations Volunteers	5 141.9	1 416.9	3 725.0
General temporary assistance	54 018.9	46 650.5	7 368.4
Subtotal	**59 864.6**	**48 067.4**	**11 797.2**
Operational costs			
Government-provided personnel	—	52.0	(52.0)
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—
Consultants	949.8	7.0	942.8
Official travel	1 382.6	333.3	1 049.4
Facilities and infrastructure	38 296.3	9 705.0	28 591.4
Ground transportation	6 750.9	849.4	5 901.5
Air transportation	45 106.1	27 224.7	17 881.4
Naval transportation	—	—	—
Communications	5 773.1	2 967.1	2 806.0
Information technology	7 048.3	873.4	6 174.9
Medical	1 296.1	804.4	491.7
Special equipment	943.3	943.3	—
Other supplies, services and equipment	21 047.6	11 325.8	9 721.8
Quick-impact projects	333.3	—	333.3
Subtotal	**128 927.4**	**55 085.4**	**73 842.0**
Gross requirements	**277 915.2**	**146 884.5**	**131 030.7**
Staff assessment income	5 892.9	—	5 892.9
Net requirements	**272 022.3**	**146 884.5**	**125 137.8**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	—	—	—
Total requirements	**277 915.2**	**146 884.5**	**131 030.7**

Annex II

UNMISS
Actual deployment of mission personnel as at 31 October 2011 and projected to 30 June 2012

		Staff on board				*Projected*								
Personnel category	*Proposed staffing*	*31 Jul 2011*	*31 Aug 2011*	*30 Sep 2011*	*31 Oct 2011*	*30 Nov 2011*	*31 Dec 2011*	*31 Jan 2012*	*29 Feb 2012*	*31 Mar 2012*	*30 Apr 2012*	*31 May 2012*	*30 June 2012*	*Average*
Military and police personnel														
Military observers	166	194	194	194	149	146	142	140	135	130	125	121	118	149
Vacancy rate		-17%	-17%	-17%	10%	12%	14%	16%	19%	22%	25%	27%	29%	10%
Military contingent personnel	6 834	5 194	5 194	5 194	5 054	4 918	4 898	4 908	6 678	6 754	6 754	6 754	6 754	5 755
Vacancy rate		24%	24%	24%	26%	28%	28%	28%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	16%
United Nations police	900	375	375	374	382	464	464	505	508	516	534	544	560	467
Vacancy rate		58%	58%	58%	58%	48%	48%	44%	44%	43%	41%	40%	38%	48%
Government-provided personnel	81	17	17	17	17	17	18	22	29	37	52	63	63	31
Vacancy rate		79%	79%	79%	79%	79%	78%	73%	64%	54%	36%	22%	22%	62%
Civilian personnel[a]														
International staff														
Professional and above	530	229	229	289	289	313	325	337	350	367	384	392	392	325
Vacancy rate		57%	57%	45%	45%	41%	39%	36%	34%	31%	28%	26%	26%	39%
Field Service and other	509	381	381	381	396	400	411	416	437	452	460	470	476	422
Vacancy rate		25%	25%	25%	22%	21%	19%	18%	14%	11%	10%	8%	6%	17%
Total, international staff	**1 039**	**610**	**610**	**670**	**685**	**713**	**736**	**753**	**787**	**819**	**844**	**862**	**868**	**746**
Vacancy rate		**41%**	**41%**	**36%**	**34%**	**31%**	**29%**	**28%**	**24%**	**21%**	**19%**	**17%**	**16%**	**28%**
National staff														
National Professional Officers	201	90	90	90	79	84	96	106	115	128	142	167	178	114
Vacancy rate		55%	55%	55%	61%	58%	52%	47%	43%	36%	29%	17%	11%	43%
General Service (Local level)	1 807	1 248	1 248	1 248	1 282	1 339	1 393	1 448	1 506	1 565	1 622	1 678	1 748	1 444
Vacancy rate		31%	31%	31%	29%	26%	23%	20%	17%	13%	10%	7%	3%	20%

Personnel category	Proposed staffing	Staff on board				Projected								
		31 Jul. 2011	31 Aug. 2011	30 Sep. 2011	31 Oct. 2011	30 Nov. 2011	31 Dec. 2011	31 Jan. 2012	29 Feb. 2012	31 Mar. 2012	30 Apr. 2012	31 May 2012	30 June 2012	Average
Total, national staff	**2 008**	**1 338**	**1 338**	**1 338**	**1 361**	**1 423**	**1 489**	**1 554**	**1 621**	**1 693**	**1 764**	**1 845**	**1 926**	**1 558**
Vacancy rate		**33%**	**33%**	**33%**	**32%**	**29%**	**26%**	**23%**	**19%**	**16%**	**12%**	**8%**	**4%**	**22%**
Total, United Nations Volunteers	**506**	**210**	**210**	**210**	**217**	**225**	**239**	**270**	**289**	**326**	**354**	**364**	**376**	**274**
Vacancy rate		**58%**	**58%**	**58%**	**57%**	**56%**	**53%**	**47%**	**43%**	**36%**	**30%**	**28%**	**26%**	**46%**
Total, civilian personnel	**3 553**	**2 158**	**2 158**	**2 218**	**2 263**	**2 361**	**2 464**	**2 577**	**2 697**	**2 838**	**2 962**	**3 071**	**3 170**	**2 578**
Vacancy rate (percentage)		**39%**	**39%**	**38%**	**36%**	**34%**	**31%**	**27%**	**24%**	**20%**	**17%**	**14%**	**11%**	**27%**

[a] Including posts and temporary positions.

Annex III

Background information on and main elements of the standardized funding model

1. In his first report on the global field support strategy (A/64/633), the Secretary-General requested authorization to develop proposals for a standardized funding model for consideration by the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session with a view to improving and accelerating the process for obtaining the necessary funding for the initial operations of new or expanding peacekeeping missions. The Advisory Committee acknowledged the possible usefulness of the standardized funding model and recommended that the General Assembly authorize the Secretary-General to submit a proposal for consideration by the General Assembly. It also emphasized that the standardized funding model should not in any way derogate from the legislative role of the General Assembly in the consideration and approval of budgets (see A/64/660, paras. 86-91). The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit proposals for a standardized funding model for the first year of peacekeeping operations for consideration by the General Assembly at the second part of its resumed sixty-fifth session, on the understanding that the model should not in any way derogate from the legislative role of the Assembly in the consideration and approval of budgets (General Assembly resolution 64/269, part VI, para. 11).

2. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 64/269, the Secretary-General submitted proposals for a standardized funding model in his report (A/65/696). In that report, the Secretary-General presented the rationale and proposals for the standardized funding model. He stated that an analysis of the start-up phase of recently established missions had shown that funding for the first full year of operations was approved by the General Assembly between 3 and 11 months after the establishment of the mandate of the mission by the Security Council. This extended process required the preparation of multiple funding requests, diverting resources both in the mission and at Headquarters from other critical tasks in the months immediately following the establishment of a mission. Furthermore, the new missions had been characterized by substantial underutilization of funding made available for them in the first year. The underspending (after recognition of subsequent cancellation of prior-period obligations) exceeded 20 per cent of the total approved budget and was due mainly to the gap between what could realistically be achieved in the first year of the mandate and what was requested.

3. The Secretary-General further stated that a standardized funding model would improve and accelerate the process for obtaining the necessary funding for start-up operations. The model used two key elements to categorize field missions: (a) standard scenarios reflecting the level of logistical challenges posed and the size of the mission area; and (b) standard profiles characterizing the level of authorized uniformed personnel, with profiles 1, 2 and 3 corresponding to authorized levels of 5,000, 10,000 and 15,000 military and police personnel, respectively. The two standard scenarios used in the standardized funding model are as follows:

(a) A baseline scenario (scenario one) for missions characterized by an area of operation limited to a single, small country, designated at security phase III, consisting of a headquarters and five regional bases. Other key characteristics used to categorize missions under the baseline scenario are detailed in paragraph 53 of

the report of the Secretary-General and include elements such as access to a seaport, the ability to reach major mission locations by rotary aircraft and a well-established local economy. Missions falling under this scenario include the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH);

(b) A second scenario (scenario two) for missions facing greater logistical challenges, which operate in an expanded area of operation with a mission headquarters, five regional bases and 15 team sites. The main characteristics of the missions associated with this scenario include the lack of a seaport, long supply chains, limited infrastructure, difficult terrain and the requirement for small fixed-wing aircraft and rotary-wing aircraft to operate in the mission area. Missions categorized under this scenario include UNMIS, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

4. The combination of the two scenarios and three profiles gives rise to six different levels of staffing and funding. The Secretary-General proposed a standard funding level for each of the resulting six scenario/profile combinations, which was derived using data on overall expenditure levels of actual start-up missions during their first year of operation, at 2011/12 rates. He indicated that the standardized funding model was built upon the operational similarity of missions in the first year of operations: while mandates differed, initial resource requirements in the first year of operations were largely similar across missions, with resource specificities arising from differences in mandates generally becoming evident in the second year of operations. However, the model would allow some flexibility to accommodate mission-specific conditions. For this reason it did not include a standard results-based-budgeting framework or detailed staffing table, which would be developed for every start-up situation. The funding proposed for civilian personnel represented an indicative level and staffing costs calculated on the basis of actual deployment experience in eight missions (UNMIL, MINUSTAH, UNOCI, ONUB, UNAMID, MONUC, UNMIS and MINURCAT). Other aspects specific to a mission would be accommodated within the standardized funding model through realignment (see A/65/696, paras. 38-45).

5. The Committee was informed that the budget proposal based on the standardized funding model for the first year of operation of a start-up mission would comprise the following elements:

(a) Mandate-specific results-based budgeting frameworks for the substantive components of the mission;

(b) An indicative results-based budgeting framework for the support component of the mission, based on the scenario and profile that most closely resembles the new mandate;

(c) A detailed mission-specific staffing table based on the mandate of the mission;

(d) Financial resources based on the scenario and profile that most closely resembles the new mandate.

6. A timeline for the application of the standardized funding model to fund a new peacekeeping mission was proposed in annex II to the Secretary-General's report (see also A/65/696, para. 38). It involved the following steps:

(a) Development of an initial commitment authority request, on the basis of the standardized funding model, within 30 days of authorization of the mandate, to be approved with the concurrence of the Advisory Committee;

(b) Development of an initial budget within 30 to 90 days of authorization of the mission, established on the basis of the standardized funding model for the balance of the financial period of the first year of operation of the mission, taking into account the activities that could reasonably be accomplished during the period. The initial budget would be submitted through the Advisory Committee to the General Assembly for consideration and approval, with an appropriation through assessed contributions. Actual expenditure would be reported to the General Assembly in the context of the first performance report;

(c) Development and submission of a full budget and performance reports in subsequent periods, based on existing procedures.

7. In its related report, the Advisory Committee included additional information, provided to it upon request, relating to: (a) the methodology used to derive the standardized funding levels for each of the six scenario/profile combinations of the model (A/65/696, table 2); and (b) the underlying cost structure of the amounts proposed under each category of expenditure, including indicative levels of civilian staffing by category of personnel, the vacancy rates applied and the average number of civilian personnel in the first year of operation (see A/65/743, paras. 196-202 and annex XI). The Committee encouraged the Secretary-General to further refine the methodology to include an analysis of the costs related to specific activities and outputs.

8. The standardized funding model was intended to accelerate the preparation of the necessary budgetary documentation, including the organizational structure, and, hence, the obtainment of funding in the start-up phase of a mission. In his report, the Secretary-General identified a number of improvements that could be expected through the application of a standardized funding model, including the following:

(a) Reduction in the time needed to develop a budget proposal since only the substantive results-based budgeting frameworks and the staffing table would have to be developed specifically for each new mission (see A/65/696, para. 41);

(b) Streamlining of the budget process as outlined in the timeline provided in annex II to the report (ibid., para. 39);

(c) Submission of a full budget for the first year within 90 days of the establishment of the mandate (ibid., para. 42 (d));

(d) Improved budgetary discipline through the provision of funding only for those activities that can be realistically achieved in the first year, thereby reducing unspent balances and providing a realistic budget implementation rate for the first year of the start-up phase (ibid., paras. 25, 30 and 32);

(e) Improved support for rapid mobilization of resources and mission deployment (ibid., paras. 35 and 42 (b));

(f) Increased transparency and accountability by establishing a standard set of funding elements that can be used as a basis for comparison and consistency in the start-up phase of different missions (ibid., para. 25);

(g) Reduction in the interval between withdrawal of strategic deployment stocks and funding from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, and replenishment (ibid., para. 42 (c)).

9. The Advisory Committee considered that the establishment of a definitive timeline and sequencing of the envisaged budgetary cycle, combined with the formulation and submission of the initial budget of a mission within 30 to 90 days of the establishment of the mandate, based on standardized and transparent costing parameters and realistic estimates of the resources that could be deployed during the first year of operations, could be a positive step. It was of the view that this could lead to fewer funding proposals through commitment authority, with or without assessment, as well as reducing the likelihood of overbudgeting in the first year of operations, as had often been the case. The Committee also stressed that the formulation of budget proposals based on a standardized funding model should not in any way lessen the requirement for a full justification of the resources proposed for the first year of operation, and that the performance reports should provide comprehensive explanations on the resources utilized, as well as details of actual achievements. The Committee welcomed the Secretary-General's initiative to streamline and rationalize the budgetary process. It indicated that it would offer further comments on the applicability of the standardized funding model and make further recommendations on the content, format and presentation of the first-year budget document in the context of its consideration of the first application of the standardized funding model to a start-up mission. In its resolution 65/289, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee (A/65/743).

10. The table below, taken from table 2 of the Secretary-General's report on the standardized funding model (A/65/696 and Corr.1), provides the indicative funding levels of the six scenario/profiles of the standardized funding model as follows. The report of the Advisory Committee contains in annexes XI and XII respectively, details on the costing parameters and assumptions underlying the standard funding levels and an example of an indicative results-based budgeting framework for the support component for a scenario two mission with a profile of 10,000 uniformed personnel.

Proposed standard funding levels for a 12-month period

	Scenario one: baseline			*Scenario two: baseline adjusted for mission size and logistical challenges*		
	Profile 1	*Profile 2*	*Profile 3*	*Profile 1*	*Profile 2*	*Profile 3*
Mandated level of uniformed personnel	5 000	10 000	15 000	5 000	10 000	15 000
Military and police personnel						
Military observers	2 673.5	5 578.3	7 968.7	2 673.5	5 578.3	7 968.7
Military contingents	82 062.7	154 673.9	234 406.4	105 797.1	198 922.3	301 595.4
United Nations police	7 535.0	15 379.8	21 882.7	7 535.0	15 379.8	21 882.7
Formed police units	6 304.5	22 066.4	34 574.9	7 751.0	27 128.7	42 530.2
Subtotal	**98 575.7**	**197 698.4**	**298 832.7**	**123 756.6**	**247 009.1**	**373 977.0**
Civilian personnel						
International staff	31 891.3	43 139.4	54 387.0	41 551.5	66 104.2	90 615.4
National staff	5 985.4	8 098.2	10 206.2	14 348.1	22 814.5	31 284.8
United Nations Volunteers	1 565.2	2 116.7	2 668.5	1 729.7	2 755.6	3 777.8
Subtotal	**39 441.9**	**53 354.3**	**67 261.7**	**57 629.3**	**91 674.3**	**125 678.0**
Operational costs						
Consultants	58.5	79.2	99.8	106.1	168.7	231.3
Official travel	832.2	1 017.3	1 205.3	1 055.6	1 498.9	1 941.0
Facilities and infrastructure	61 431.8	95 451.6	130 777.8	82 578.6	123 487.6	165 693.7
Ground transportation	33 111.0	49 218.6	64 373.6	40 494.4	60 262.8	78 978.8
Air transportation	45 322.2	45 322.2	45 322.2	142 001.5	142 001.5	142 001.5
Communications	22 977.6	25 770.0	30 633.3	30 055.4	33 779.1	39 598.4
Information technology	7 874.4	9 759.7	11 598.1	9 763.4	13 089.6	16 229.8
Medical	2 072.2	3 972.0	5 858.5	2 579.7	4 509.1	6 650.3
Special equipment	1 094.4	2 187.8	3 267.4	1 188.2	2 373.5	3 543.1
Other supplies, services and equipment	5 585.7	9 365.9	13 048.0	9 713.8	17 512.3	25 209.7
Quick-impact projects	800	700	900	700	900	900
Subtotal	**180 760.0**	**242 844.3**	**307 084.0**	**320 236.7**	**399 583.1**	**488 977.6**
Gross requirements	**318 777.6**	**493 897.0**	**673 178.4**	**501 622.6**	**738 266.5**	**988 632.6**
Staff assessment income	4 232.9	5 726.2	7 219.3	6 476.1	10 302.0	14 122.8
Net requirements	**314 544.7**	**488 170.8**	**665 959.1**	**495 146.5**	**727 964.5**	**966 509.8**
Total requirements	**318 777.6**	**493 897.0**	**673 178.4**	**501 622.6**	**738 266.5**	**988 632.6**

11. The table below provides a summary of the standard staffing and deployment levels by category of personnel, based on data contained in annex XI to the Advisory Committee's report on the standardized funding model (A/65/743).

Standard staffing and deployment levels by category of personnel

	Scenario one: baseline			*Scenario two: baseline adjusted for mission size and logistical challenges*		
	Profile 1	*Profile 2*	*Profile 3*	*Profile 1*	*Profile 2*	*Profile 3*
Mandated level of uniformed personnel	**5 000**	**10 000**	**15 000**	**5 000**	**10 000**	**15 000**
Military and police personnel						
Military observers						
Authorized strength	100	200	300	100	200	300
Delayed deployment factor (%)	43	43	43	43	43	43
Estimated monthly deployment	57	120	171	57	120	171
Military contingents						
Authorized strength	4 255	8 065	12 100	4 255	8 065	12 100
Delayed deployment factor (%)	35	35	35	35	35	35
Estimated deployment	2 771	5 251	7 879	2 771	5 251	7 879
United Nations police						
Authorized strength	365	745	1 060	365	745	1 060
Delayed deployment factor (%)	56	56	56	56	56	56
Estimated deployment	280	980	1 540	280	980	1 540
Formed police units						
Authorized strength	280	980	1 540	280	980	1 540
Delayed deployment factor (%)	35	35	35	35	35	35
Estimated deployment	183	641	1 007	183	641	1 007
Total uniformed personnel deployed	**3 291**	**6 992**	**10 597**	**3 291**	**6 992**	**10 597**
Civilian personnel	**936**	**1 266**	**1 596**	**1 696**	**2 697**	**3 699**
International staff						
Staffing complement	349	469	560	452	719	981
Delayed deployment factor (%)	54	54	54	54	54	54
Estimated deployment	161	216	271	208	331	454
National staff						
Staffing complement	448	607	766	1 090	1 734	2 378
Delayed deployment factor (%)	63	63	63	63	63	63
Estimated deployment	166	225	283	403	642	880
United Nations Volunteers						
Staffing complement	139	190	240	154	244	335
Delayed deployment factor (%)	49	49	49	49	49	49
Estimated deployment	71	97	122	79	124	171
Total civilian personnel deployed	**398**	**538**	**676**	**690**	**1 097**	**1 505**

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Agenda item 33
The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict

Letter dated 6 December 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour, on behalf of the Chair of the Kimberley Process, and pursuant to paragraph 22 of General Assembly resolution 65/137, entitled "The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts", to transmit the 2011 Kimberley Process report (see annex) and to request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33 of its sixty-sixth session.

(*Signed*) Charlotte **Malenga Omoy**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo to the United Nations

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Annex to the letter dated 6 December 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Report of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to the General Assembly for 2011

Submitted by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chair of the Kimberley Process for 2011

Introduction

1. In its resolution 65/137 of 16 December 2010, the General Assembly requested the Chair of the Kimberley Process to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-sixth session a report on the implementation of the Process. The General Assembly also decided to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-sixth session the item entitled "The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict". In this connection, as Chair of the Kimberley Process for 2011, the Democratic Republic of the Congo submits the following report on the question. The report covers developments since the submission of the report by the State of Israel dated November 2010 (A/65/607) in its capacity as Chair for 2010, and includes the final communiqué of the Kinshasa plenary meeting, held from 31 October to 3 November 2011.

2. The Kimberley Process is a joint initiative of Governments, the diamond industry and civil society, established to prevent the flow of blood diamonds into legitimate international trade. The Process aims to break the link between trade in blood diamonds and armed conflict, considering in particular its devastating impact on peace, safety and security of people. The Kimberley Process is implemented by each participating country through national laws and regulations, and the establishment of a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of blood diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into or exported from its territory. Many countries that had been affected by conflict now have peace and stability. With the elimination of illegal diamonds, legitimate trade is generating revenue used to finance public programmes, thereby creating favourable conditions for diamond-producing countries to reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. To date, almost all countries that produce, process and trade diamonds participate in the Process.

3. In its resolution 55/56, adopted in 2000, the General Assembly expressed the need for the creation and implementation of an international scheme for rough diamonds; in resolution 57/302, adopted in 2003, it welcomed the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which had been launched officially at Interlaken, Switzerland, in November 2002. Each year since then, the General Assembly has debated the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict and has reaffirmed its support for the Process. In addition, the Security Council, in its resolution 1459 (2003), strongly supported the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme as a valuable contribution against trafficking in conflict diamonds.

Contribution to international peace and security

4. Since the establishment of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in 2003, there has been a dramatic improvement in the security situation in several diamond-producing countries, due largely to the implementation of the Certification Scheme. In compliance with Security Council resolution 1980 (2011), the security situation in Côte d'Ivoire was closely monitored by the Kimberley Process through its Working Group on Monitoring, and the Working Group of Diamond Experts, by the Friends of Côte d'Ivoire, and during the plenary in Kinshasa. At that plenary, a representative of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire made a presentation on the situation in that country since its reunification and on efforts made by the recently elected Government to prepare the country for implementation of the Certification Scheme. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1980 (2011), the Kimberley Process has worked in collaboration with the United Nations Group of Experts and Sanctions Committee on Côte d'Ivoire. Participants in the Kimberley Process have continued to monitor and report on all packages suspected of originating in Côte d'Ivoire.

5. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1961 (2010), the Kimberley Process continues to monitor progress in implementation of internal controls in Liberia. Implementation-related problems still need to be addressed in collaboration with the Liberia Kimberley Process authorities and the United Nations Group of Experts on Liberia. The Working Group of Diamond Experts has also continued its work, in collaboration with the Liberia Kimberley Process authorities and the United Nations Group of Experts on Liberia on footprinting Liberian diamonds.

6. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/137, the Kimberley Process has continued monitoring progress in implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in West Africa. Guinea, in particular, has worked to strengthen its certification system and apply the Swakopmund administrative decision on Guinea (2009). A geological study has been conducted by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) in collaboration with the Working Group of Diamond Experts.

Achievements during 2011

7. The 2011 Kimberley Process plenary meeting was held from 31 October to 3 November in Kinshasa; seven administrative decisions were adopted.

8. In its administrative decision on Marange (Zimbabwe), the plenary authorized the resumption of diamond exports from that region, in compliance with the minimum requirements of the Certification Scheme.

9. As Chair of the Kimberley Process, the Democratic Republic of the Congo placed a priority on reform and periodic review of the Process. Substantial progress was made on these two issues during 2011 within the ad hoc committee on reform, chaired by Botswana. On the basis of the committee's work, the Kinshasa plenary adopted two important decisions. The first mandated the committee to approach international institutions that would be willing to host an administrative support mechanism of the Process and how that could be accomplished. The committee was also instructed to discuss specific aspects such as the form, operation and financing of the proposed mechanism. The second decision laid down terms of reference for

conducting periodic reviews of the Kimberley Process, involving a thorough analysis, over a period of two years, of the operation of the Process and of the Kimberley Process core document and suggestions for improvement submitted for consideration by the plenary.

10. As Chair of the Kimberley Process, the Democratic Republic of the Congo also placed a priority on strengthening the Certification System, especially with regard to the level of internal controls. In this connection, the Kinshasa plenary adopted an administrative decision setting out guidelines for import confirmations. Systematic implementation of these guidelines will help to tighten controls and to more efficiently identify anomalies between countries importing or exporting rough diamonds, prior to the submission of consolidated statistics.

11. The Chair of the Kimberley Process also attached high priority to cooperation with the World Customs Organization (WCO), through the Enforcement Committee of WCO. The Chair attended a meeting of the Enforcement Committee in May 2011. Thanks to this collaboration, customs organizations of countries participating in the Kimberley Process as well as non-participants will be able to help the Process to achieve its goals and implement its policies. WCO representatives contacted the Process to organize an enforcement seminar in the margins of the intersessional meeting in Kinshasa in June 2011, and provided valuable assistance to the Process working groups, in particular the Working Group of Diamond Experts, on issues relating to classification and countries of origin. The World Customs Organization also opened its network of regional capacity-building offices to support the training of customs agents in implementing minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process.

12. With regard to enforcement, the Working Group on Monitoring also coordinates the detection and investigation of fraudulent Kimberley Process certificates, as well as the detection and reporting of packages of suspect origin and the exchange of information on violations. The guidelines on annual reports of participants will be clarified in order to provide for inclusion in those reports of information on the implementation of enforcement measures within the context of the Process.

13. The Kinshasa plenary adopted a decision terminating the precautionary measures put in place by Ghana pursuant to the administrative decision of 2006, owing to the positive actions taken to reinforce internal controls and prevent the infiltration of illicit diamonds into its production.

14. The Kinshasa plenary also adopted a decision on clarifications of rules and procedures for the approval of decisions through the written procedure, which enables the Kimberley Process to adopt decisions on urgent matters, including between plenary meetings.

Participation: the Kimberley Process has 50 participants

15. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is open, without discrimination, to all countries and to any regional economic integration organization that agrees to and can comply with its requirements. In May 2011, the Kingdom of Swaziland joined the Kimberley Process. As of 3 November 2011, the total number of participants in the Process stood at 50, representing 76 countries (including the

27 States members of the European Union). Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kazakhstan, Mali, Mozambique and Panama have expressed an interest in joining the Process. The Participation Committee is helping them prepare their applications and continues to explore a list of potential candidates and to contact them.

16. At the Kinshasa plenary, an administrative decision was adopted by which the terms of reference of the Participation Committee were redefined. The Participation Committee has prepared recommendations for candidates on legislation for implementation of the Kimberley Process. These recommendations will be provided to new candidates when necessary, in order to assist them in preparing their applications.

Monitoring and peer review: a vital Kimberley Process tool

17. The Kimberley Process has taken note of the results of participants' compliance with the requirement to submit annual reports, which is the most important means for obtaining complete and regular information on the status of implementation of the Certification System. As at 3 November 2011, 45 participants representing 71 countries had submitted their annual reports. The Chair of the Kimberley Process was requested by the plenary to contact participants that had not yet submitted their annual reports, including Indonesia and Zimbabwe.

18. In 2008, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela voluntarily withdrew from the Process for a period of two years, suspending its exports and imports of rough diamonds. In 2010, Brazil presented a decision from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to extend its self-suspension for an additional year. At the Kinshasa plenary, a representative of the Government of Venezuela presented to the Process a letter explaining the current status of its diamond mining operations and its development plans. However, given the continued non-compliance of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with the minimum Kimberley Process requirements and its failure to submit annual reports for 2009 and 2010, as well as the relevant statistical data, the plenary decided that if the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela did not submit the reports by 20 December 2011, it would be removed from the list of Kimberley Process participants.

19. One of the main objectives of the Working Group on Monitoring is to implement the system of peer review visits, which is an important tool for enhancing the effectiveness of the Process, ensuring that participants identify and remedy compliance issues, and facilitating the sharing of best practices relating to the Process. The second series of review visits involved producing countries (Botswana, Lesotho) and industrial countries (Ukraine and, in late 2010, India); the next review visits are planned for Canada, Lebanon, Switzerland, Thailand and the United States of America.

20. The increase in online sales and postal shipments is an issue of concern, given the difficulty of monitoring and analysing shipments of rough diamonds through those means. In such transactions, Kimberley Process certificates are not always transmitted to customs authorities. Online and postal sales can seriously affect the quality of participants' statistics and those of their trading partners. The Kimberley Process has set up a team of technical experts on import confirmations and online trade who will conduct research on trends in online trading of rough diamonds. Canada is coordinating this work.

Statistics

21. The monitoring of statistical data on production and trading of rough diamonds is an essential aspect of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and a regular source of information on implementation. The submission of quarterly, biannual and annual statistics is a minimum requirement of the system. The Kimberley Process Rough Diamond Statistics website, which is managed by the United States of America, has been upgraded to make it more efficient and effective. The system is protected by security mechanisms that prevent unauthorized access (the website is only accessible to participants) and that allow for quality control, so as to ensure that all data are consistent at the time of registration.

Technical issues and traceability

22. The Working Group of Diamond Experts is working on footprinting diamonds produced in Liberia (see above), the Bria region in the Central African Republic, the Marange region in Zimbabwe, and in Sierra Leone. Kimberley Process authorities in Brazil are working on footprinting Brazilian diamonds.

23. Under South Africa's leadership, the Working Group is developing a rough diamond valuation methodology using a valuation data matrix.

Artisanal/alluvial production

24. The Working Group on Artisanal and Alluvial Production is promoting more effective local controls over the production and trade of alluvial diamonds, so as to ensure that only diamonds that are produced and sold in conformity with national legislation and the standards of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme are exported. Artisanal diamond producers and miners are constantly being confronted with serious developmental challenges that are an obstacle to the effective implementation of the Certification Scheme on the ground.

25. The Working Group is considering issues relating to implementation of the recommendations on the Kimberley Process Moscow Declaration on internal controls, with the help of the Diamond Development Initiative, based on information supplied by participants. Members of the Working Group have stated that there is a need for technical assistance and training on alluvial diamond mining methods adapted for artisanal miners.

Future challenges

26. The Kimberley Process maintains its tripartite through the ongoing cooperation of Governments, industry — through the World Diamond Council — and civil society, represented by the Civil Society Coalition. In practice, this means that civil society organizations participate in the annual reporting of information on national developments and submit proposals on various modalities of implementation of the Certification Scheme. Civil society partnered with the World Customs Organization in organizing the seminar on enforcement that was held in June 2011 in the margins of the Kinshasa intersessional meeting.

27. However, the civil society representatives decided not to participate in the Kinshasa plenary of November 2011, despite the Chair's attempts to engage in dialogue. Their absence was deeply regretted by the Kimberley Process participants and other observers, who appealed to civil society to resume contacts with the Process and to participate actively in its work. Civil society participation is essential, especially in the light of the reform process and the periodic review being undertaken to improve the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

28. Indeed, reform of the Kimberley Process, improvement of its effectiveness (in particular through an administrative support mechanism) and the periodic review of the Certification Scheme are among the greatest challenges facing the Process going forward.

29. The United States of America will succeed the Democratic Republic of the Congo as Chair of the Kimberley Process, with effect from 1 January 2012, and South Africa will serve as Vice-Chair in 2012.